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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL
Captain Gregory E. Maggs1
Opinions and conclusions in articles published in the Military Law Review
are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Judge Advocate General, the Department of the Army, or any other
gove rnment agency.

I. Introduction
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) establishes the basic
structure of the military justice system.2 It specifies the requirements for
convening courts-martial,3 defines the jurisdiction of courts-martial,4 and
identifies the offenses that courts-martial may punish.5 Congress, however,
did not intend the UCMJ to stand-alone. On the contrary, it specifically
directed the President to promulgate procedural, evidentiary, and other
rules to govern the military justice system.6 The President has complied
with this directive by issuing a series of executive orders, which make up
the Manual for Courts-Martial (Manual).7

1

Judge Advo cate General’s Corps, U nited S tates Army Reserve. Pre sently
assigned as an ind ividual mobilization augmentee with duty in the Criminal Law
Division, Office of the Judge Ad vocate Genera l. The author is an asso ciate
professor of law at the George W ashington University Law School. I thank
Asso ciate Dean Jo hn S. Jenkins (Rea r Admiral, U .S. Navy, retired), Professor
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Professor Jonathan R. Siegel, Majo r Denise Lind, and the
faculty of The Judge A dvocate General’s School, U.S. Army, for their helpful
comm ents. John Nargiso, J.D. 1999, greatly assisted with the research. Dean
Michael K. Youn g and the George W ashington University Law School provided
generous suppo rt.
2
10 U .S.C.A . §§ 8 01-9 46 (W est 1998).
3
See id. § 822 (identifying the officers and government officials who may
convene a court-martial).
4
See id. § 817 (defining jurisdiction).
5
See id. §§ 881 -934 (stating offenses).
6
See infra Part II.A (describing the P resident’s autho rity to make rules).
7
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STAT ES (1998) [hereinafter
MC M]. Footnotes in this article will refer to all editions of the Manual from 1984
until the present as “MCM ,” unless context otherwise requires. See id. at A25-1
through 34 (listing amendments to the Manual during this period). The 1984
version of the Manual replaced and substantially changed the MANUAL FO R
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The Manual consists of five parts. Part I is the “Preamble,” which
explains the Manual’s structure and authority.8 Part II contains the “Rules
*97 for Courts-Martial,” which govern pre-trial, trial, and post-trial
procedures.9 Part III states the “Military Rules of Evidence,” which
principally regulate the modes of proof at courts-martial.10 Part IV
describes and explains the “Punitive Articles” of the UCMJ (that is, the
crimes that the UCMJ makes punishable), listing their elements, identifying
lesser-included offenses, establishing the maximum punishments, and
providing sample specifications.11 Part V explains the “Nonjudicial
Punishment Procedures” that commanders can impose under UCMJ Article
15 without a court-martial.12
The U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) publishes the Manual as
part of a single volume book. Military attorneys often refer to the entire
book as the Manual for Courts-Martial, but this practice is somewhat
misleading. The volume published by the GPO contains not only what the
President has promulgated through executive orders, but also a variety of
supplementary materials. These materials include short discussion
paragraphs accompanying the preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, the
punitive articles;13 three treatise-like analyses of the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence, the Punitive Articles; 14 and miscellaneous additional appendices.15 Unlike Parts I through V, the President did
not promulgate these materials by executive order, and therefore they are
not actually part of the Manual.16

COURT S-MARTIAL, UN ITED STA TE S (1969) [hereinafter MC M 1 969]. The
1969 Man ual superseded the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED
STATE S (1951) [hereinafter MCM 1951]. For history of the Ma nua l, see MCM,
supra at A21-1 through A21 -2; Fredric I. Lederer, The Military Rules of Evidence:
Origins and Judicial Interpretation, 130 M IL. L. REV. 5, 6-8 (1990).
8
See MCM , supra note 7 , pmb l.
9
See id. R.C.M. 101-1306.
10
See id. MIL. R. EV ID. 1 01-1 103 .
11
See id. at IV-1 through IV-123; UCM J arts. 77-134.
12
See id. at V-1 through V-9 .
13
See MCM , supra note 7, pmbl. discussion.
14
See id.
15
See id.
16
See id.
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The Court of Military Appeals long ago described the Manual as the
military lawyer’s “Bible.”17 Anyone familiar with the military justice
system could agree with this characterization. Judge advocates constantly
must turn to the Manual for direction. Indeed, attempting to conduct a
court-martial without referring to the Manual’s numerous rules would be
impossible. Yet, if the Manual has the attributes of a holy scripture, then
*98 the military courts18 have seen more than a few heretics. In well over
a hundred-reported instances, defense and government counsel have asked
courts to invalidate or ignore Manual provisions.19 The courts themselves
have not entirely kept the faith; over the past few decades, they have
refused to enforce the Manual in dozens of cases.20
Litigants often have a strong motive for
Manual provision. The rules stated in the
outcomes of criminal trials or the length
conviction. In capital cases, the rules of
difference between life and death.

wanting to avoid applying a
Manual may determine the
of sentences imposed upon
the Manual may make the

The judiciary, therefore, gives serious attention to challenges to the
Manual. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court recently reviewed two
cases that contested the validity of rules in the Manual. In United States v.
Scheffer,21 the accused contested the validity of Military Rule of Evidence

17

See United States v. Drain, 16 C.M.R. 220, 222 (1954) (“This Court has, from
the first, emphasized that the Manual for Co urts-M artial constitutes the m ilitary
lawyer’s vade mecum--his very Bible.”). Many cases refer to the Manual as the
“Bib le.” See, e.g, United States v. Dunnahoe, 21 C.M.R. 67, 75 (1956); United
States v. Deain, 17 C.M.R. 44, 52 (1954); United States v. Morris, 15 C.M.R. 209,
212 (19 54); United States v. Hemp, 3 C.M .R. 14, 19 (1952 ).
18
This article uses the term “military courts” to refer to co urts-martial, the
United States Army, Navy-Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard Courts of
Criminal App eals (and their predecessors, the Courts of Military Review and the
Board s of Review), and the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(and its predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals). On 5 October 19 94, the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, 108
Stat. 2663 (1994), changed the names of the United States courts of Military
Review and the United States Court of Military Appeals. The new names are the
United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals, the United States Air Force Court
of Criminal Appeals, the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal
App eals, the United States Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and the United
States C ourt of App eals for the Armed Forc es.
19
See infra Part IV (discussing challenges and leading cases).
20
See id.
21
118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
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707(a), which bars the admission of polygraph results.22 In Loving v.
United States,23 a capital defendant asked the Supreme Court to strike
down Rule for Courts-Martial 1004(c), which specifies the aggravating
factors that may justify imposing the death penalty. 24
Oddly, despite the frequency and importance of litigation over the
validity of the rules of the Manual, the topic has received little attention
*99 outside of the courts. A few law review articles have addressed the
President’s authority to promulgate Manual provisions.25 Yet, no work has
comprehensively studied the numerous grounds upon which courts have
invalidated portions of the Manual. This article seeks to perform this task.
Part II of this article describes the President’s authority for promulgating
the Manual, the ways in which challenges to the Manual arise, and the law
governing these challenges. It explains that neither the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)26 nor any other statute, specifies the grounds upon
which courts may invalidate portions of the Manual. Military tribunals,
consequently, have needed to devise their own doctrines for reviewing
Manual provisions.
Part III proposes three principles to guide courts in developing rules for
reviewing challenges to the Manual. First, courts should follow general
22

See MCM , supra note 7, MIL. R. EV ID. 707(a) (“No twithstanding any other
provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a
polygraph exam ination, shall not be adm itted into evidence.”).
23
517 U .S. 748 (1996 ).
24
See MCM , supra note 7, R.C.M. 1004(c) (identifying eleven aggravating
factors, such as com mitting an offense in way that would cause “substantial damage
to national security” or committing murder “for the purpose of receiving money”).
25
See Eugene R . Fidell, Judicial Review of Presidential Rulemaking under
Article 36: The Sleeping Giant Stirs, 4 MIL. L. RPTR. 6049 (1976) (presenting the
most comprehensive study of judicial review of the Manual to date); William F.
Fratcher, Presidential Power to Reg ulate Military Justice: A Critical Study of
Decisions of the Cou rt of Military App eals, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861, 890 (1959)
(urging the Co urt of M ilitary Appeals to exercise greater restraint in invalidating
Manual provisions); Annamary S ullivan, The President’s Power to Pro mu lgate
Death Pen alty Stand ards, 125 M IL. L. REV. 143 (1989) (addressing similar
argum ents with specific references to R.C .M. 100 4(c)); Fred erick B . W iener, Are
the General Military Articles Un con stitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A. J. 357, 361
(1968) (considering whether Congress properly delegated power to the President
to promulgate the Manual).
26
See Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in various sections o f 5 U.S.C.).
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principles of administrative law, such as those codified in the APA, unless
military considerations require otherwise. Second, courts generally should
defer to the Manual because the President promulgated it not only pursuant
to statutory authority, but also in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.
Third, courts should strive for consistency in their treatment of challenges
to the Manual.
Part IV describes and analyzes the following nine arguments that
litigants have advanced when asking courts to ignore or invalidate Manual
provisions:
(1) The Manual provision is merely precatory.
(2) The Manual provision conflicts with the UCMJ.
*100 (3) The Manual provision conflicts with another Manual
provision.
(4) The Manual provision conflicts with a federal regulation.
(5) The President lacked authority to promulgate the Manual provision.
(6) The Manual provision is arbitrary and capricious.
(7) The Manual provision interprets an ambiguous portion of the UCMJ
and a better interpretation is possible.
(8) The President promulgated the Manual pursuant to an improper
delegation from Congress.
(9) The Manual provision violates the accused’s constitutional rights.
II. Authority, Challenges, and Judicial Review
Before addressing how military judges should review Manual provisions, a few preliminary matters require discussion. The following sections
document the President’s statutory and constitutional power to promulgate
the Manual. They further explain how challenges to the provisions of the
Manual usually arise. Finally, they describe how the military courts have
devised legal doctrines for evaluating these challenges.
A. The President’s Power to Promulgate the Manual
The UCMJ contains three articles that grant the President power to
promulgate the provisions of the Manual. Article 36 authorizes the
President to create procedural and evidentiary rules, such as the Rules for
Courts-Martial and the Military Rules of Evidence found in Parts II and III
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of the Manual.27 Articles 18 and 56 authorize the President to set limits on
the punishment for violation of the punitive articles of the UCMJ, which he
has done in specifying the maximum sentence for offenses in Part IV of
Manual.28
Even if the UCMJ did not contain these articles, the President may have
inherent power to promulgate rules of evidence and procedure to govern
courts-martial. His authority would come from the constitutional provision
making him the Commander-in-Chief.29 Although the Constitution *101
does not elaborate on the Commander-in-Chief’s powers, he always has had
the power to issue orders to the military. As discussed more fully below,
the President could use this authority to create rules for courts-martial.30
Indeed, during the previous century, the President directed the conduct of
courts-martial without specific statutory authority. 31
In discussing the President’s authority for issuing the Manual, one
important point deserves attention. As noted above, the President promulgated only Parts I through V of the Manual by executive order, and did not
issue the supplementary materials that are printed with these parts.32
Instead, the Department of Defense and the Department of Treasury
prepared the supplementary materials largely for informational purposes.
33
These provisions, as a result, do not purport to have the force of law.34
27

See 10 U.S.C.A. § 83 6(a) (W est 1998). P r e t r i a l , t r i a l, a n d p o s t - t r ia l
procedures, including mo des of pro of, for cases arising under this c hapter triable
in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures
for courts of inquiry, may be prescrib ed by the President by regulations which sh all,
so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inc onsisten t with this chapter.Id.
28
See id. § 818 (“[G]eneral courts-martial have jurisdiction to try persons
subject to this chapter for any offense made punishable b y this chap ter and may,
under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment not
forbidden by this cha pter, including the penalty of death wh en specifically
authorized by this cha pter.”); id. § 856(a) (“The punishment which a court-martial
may direct for an offense may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe
for that o ffense.”).
29
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
30
See infra Part IV.E .2.
31
See Fidell, supra note 2 5, at 60 50 & n. 11; W iener, supra note 25, at 361.
32
See MCM , supra note 7 , pmb l.
33
See id.
34
See id.
These supplementary mater ials do not constitute the official views of the
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Thus, they raise no real issue about the President’s statutory or constitutional authority.
B. How Challenges to the Manual Arise
Most challenges to Manual provisions come from the accused. A
defendant who disfavors applying a rule of evidence or procedure may look
for grounds for invalidating it. For example, in Scheffer, the accused *102
desired to present evidence from a polygraph test.35 He, therefore, asked
the courts to invalidate the prohibition against polygraph evidence in
Military Rule of Evidence 707(a).36 Similarly, in Loving, the accused asked
the court to invalidate the capital sentencing procedures so that he would
not receive the death penalty.37
Government counsel rarely contest the validity of Manual provisions.
Although individual prosecutors may not favor all of its procedural and
evidentiary rules, the Manual states official policy. Attorneys for the
government generally have no authority to question its requirements, even
if these requirements sometimes make convicting the accused more
difficult.
Occasions can arise, however, where prosecutors will challenge the
Manual. Sometimes, a government counsel inadvertently will fail to follow
one requirement of the Manual, and will seek to avoid the consequences of
the error by contesting the enforceability of the provision. In United States
v. Solnick,38 for example, the government violated Rule for Courts-Martial
1107 when the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction instead
of the convening authority approved the sentences.39 *103 When the

Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Justice, the military departments, the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Armed Forces, or any other authority of the Government of the United
States, and the do not constitute rules.... The supplementary materials do not
create rights or respo nsibilities that are binding on any person, party, or
other entity (include the authority of the Government of the United States
whether or not included in the definition of “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1)).
Id.

35

United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 126 3 (1998 ).
See id. at 1264.
37
See Loving v. United States, 517 U .S. 748, 755-74 (19 96).
38
39 M .J. 930 (N .M.C.M .R. 19 94).
39
See MCM , supra note 7, R.C.M. 1007. The conv ening authority shall take
action on the sentence ... unless it is impracticable. If it is impracticable for the
convening authority to act, the convening authority shall ... forward the case to an
36
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accused sought reversal, the government counsel argued that the court
could not enforce Rule 1107.40
The accused and the government must act in a timely fashion if they
wish to challenge Manual provisions. Failure to raise arguments at the trial,
or sometimes even during pre-trial proceedings, may waive the right to
present them later.41 Counsel, accordingly, should object to Manual
provisions that they consider improper at the earliest possible opportunity,
and thus preserve the right to appeal unfavorable rulings.
C. Law Governing Challenges to Manual Provisions
Although military courts often say that the Manual has the force of
law,42 they have recognized a number of exceptions to its enforceability.
As described more fully below, the courts have refused to enforce Manual
provisions for a number of different reasons.43 For example, they have
ignored or invalidated rules that conflict with the UCMJ, that the President
promulgated without authority, that they have found arbitrary and
capricious, and so forth.44
Despite the willingness of the court to strike down Manual provisions,
the authority for judicial review of the Manual remains surprisingly
unclear. Nothing in the UCMJ or any other statute identifies the different
grounds for striking Manual provisions. Although the Manual contains
*104 rules that resemble administrative law, the APA does not apply to

officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction who may take action und er this
rule.Id.
40
See Solnick, 39 M.J. at 934 . See also United States v. Morlan, 24 C.M.R. 390,
394 (A.B.R. 1957) (involving a government challenge to the 1951 Ma nua l,
paragraph 126d, which precluded warrant officers from receiving bad conduct
discharges).
41
See MCM , supra note 7, R.C.M. 905 (e).
Failure by a p arty to rais e
defenses or objections to mak e mo tions or requests which must be made before
pleas are entered under subsection (b) of this rule [i.e., pretrial motions] shall
constitute waiver. The military judge for good cause shown may grant relief from
the waiver. Other motions, requests, defenses, or objections, except lack of
jurisdiction or failure of a charge to allege an offense, must be raised before the
court-martial is adjourned for that case and unless otherwise provided in this
Manua l, failure to do so shall constitute waiver.Id.
42
See, e.g., United States v. Barton, 6 M .J. 16 (C.M.A. 197 8); United States v.
Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105, 118 (1962); Levy v. Dillon, 286 F. Supp. 593, 596 (D. Kan.
196 8), aff’d 415 F.2d 126 3 (10th Cir. 196 9).
43
See infra Parts IV.A.-I.
44
See id.
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executive orders.45 The APA, consequently, does not establish bases for
invalidating the Manual, as it does for striking down federal regulations.46
The military courts, however, have not let the absence of explicit
statutory authority impede judicial review. Instead, as shown later in this
article, they simply have developed their own doctrines for review on a
case-by-case basis. 47 In evaluating challenges to the Manual, the courts
now rely on numerous precedents that have established a variety of grounds
for striking Manual provisions.
Judicially created doctrines for reviewing the Manual seem almost
inevitable. Although Congress could have given the courts express
authority to evaluate the legality of the Rules for Courts-Martial, the
Military Rules of Evidence, and the rest of the Manual, it did not. Given the
serious consequences of criminal trials, however, the courts could not be
expected to ignore challenges to the Manual. They, therefore, created their
own rules for addressing them.
In fact, review of the Manual through court-made doctrines has become
so thoroughly established that questioning their legality would serve little
purpose. The military courts are not prepared to stop striking down
provisions that they find improper under their precedents. This article,
accordingly, does not attempt to address whether the military courts should

45

See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01 (1992) (holding that the
APA prescribes rules only for agencies, and the President is not an agency).
46
The APA authorizes courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions” if they find them:
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contra ry to constitutional right, power, privilege, o r immunity;
(C) in excess of statuto ry jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and
557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing
provided by statute; or
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
5 U .S.C.A . § 70 6(2) (W est 1998).
47
See infra Part IV.
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have developed doctrines for adjudicating the validity of Manual *105
provisions. Instead, it merely seeks to examine the doctrines that the courts
have created, and to suggest ways that they might improve them.
III. General Principles for Judicial Review
The military courts have developed a number of principles to govern
interpreting Manual provisions. The cases, for example, explain that courts
should attempt to follow the intent of the President in promulgating the
Manual.48 They indicate that courts should construe the rules of evidence
and procedure liberally so that the accused may present all valid defenses.49
They state that courts generally should not apply new rules retroactively.50
They assert that, where possible, courts should interpret the rules of the
Manual to prevent conflict with the UCMJ.51 They also declare that courts
should follow the rule of leniency, construing ambiguities in the Manual
against the government.52
In creating doctrines for reviewing the legality of Manual provisions,
however, the military courts have acted in a largely ad hoc manner. As the
following part of this article will show,53 they have handled challenges to
Manual provisions on a case-by-case basis. They generally have not
attempted to harmonize their approaches to different kinds of problems
with the Manual. They also have not articulated general principles to
govern judicial review.
Several factors make the piecemeal approach of the military courts
understandable. In the absence of explicit authority to review Manual
provisions,54 the courts have had little external guidance. Consequently,
they may have hesitated to take broad steps. Gradually fashioning doctrines

48

See United States v. Leonard, 21 M.J. 67, 68 (C.M.A. 1985); United States
v. Clark, 37 M.J. 1098, 1103 (N.M .C.M.R. 199 3); United States v. Fisher, 37 M.J.
812, 818 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993); United States v. Sturgeon, 37 M.J. 1083, 1087
(N.M .C.M .R. 19 93).
49
United States v. Coffin, 25 M.J. 32, 34 (C.M .A. 1987); United States v. Clark,
37 M.J. 1098, 1103 (N.M.C.M.R. 1993); United States v. Czekala, 38 M.J. 566,
573 (A.C.M .R. 1993).
50
United States v. Leonard, 21 M.J. 67, 69 (C .M.A. 19 85).
51
United States v. LaGrange, 3 C.M.R. 76, 79 (1952); United States v. Marrie,
39 M .J. 993, 997 (A.F.C.M .R. 1994).
52
See United States v. W hite, 39 M.J. 796, 80 2 (N .M.C.M .R. 19 94).
53
See infra Part IV (describing the development of different doctrines for
reviewing the nine most commo n types of challenges).
54
See supra Part II.C. (explaining the lack of exp licit authority).
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for reviewing challenges to the Manual, moreover, has allowed them to
learn *106 from experience. On the whole, they have not produced many
controversial results.
The following discussion, however, suggests and defends three general
principles that the military courts should strive to follow when reviewing
Manual provisions. First, the military courts should look to ordinary
administrative law doctrines for guidance in reviewing Manual provisions,
even if these doctrines do not bind them. Second, the military courts should
accord great deference to policy choices that the President has expressed
in the Manual. Third, the military courts should strive for consistency as
they develop doctrines for reviewing challenges to the Manual.
These principles will not eliminate the need for courts to make difficult
decisions when determining the validity of the Military Rules of Evidence,
Rules for Courts-Martial, and other parts of the Manual. For reasons
explained below, however, the principles should improve the decisions of
the courts. Part IV of this article, consequently, will refer repeatedly to each
of these principles when analyzing the leading cases on the various types
of challenges to Manual provisions.
A. Reliance on General Principles of Administrative Law
Although no legislation directly addresses judicial review of the
Manual, the military courts do not have to start fresh when deciding how
to evaluate contested provisions. On the contrary, they can and should look
to external legal sources for guidance. In particular, the courts can learn
from the experience of the federal courts in reviewing administrative
materials.
Challenges to regulations issued by federal administrative agencies
often resemble challenges to Manual provisions. The federal courts, for
example, have considered whether agencies have authority to promulgate
regulations,55 whether regulations conflict with statutes,56 whether

55

See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Scho ol B d., Inc. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1349
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that an agency exceeded its statutory au thority in
promulgating fund allocation rules); Health Ins. Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Shalala,
23 F.3d 412, 41 8-20 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that an agency exceeded its statutory
authority in promulgating regulations concerning Medicare payment recovery).
56
See, e.g., Time W arner Entertainment Co. v. Federal Communications
Comm ’n, 56 F .3d 1 51, 1 87 (D.C . Cir. 19 95), cert. denied 516 U.S. 1112 (1 996);
National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F .2d 637, 647 (D.C. Cir.
197 6).
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regulations*107 are arbitrary and capricious,57 and so forth. Their
experience in assessing these challenges may aid the military courts as they
evaluate similar challenges to the Military Rules of Evidence, the Rules for
Courts-Martial, and other portions of the Manual.
The Supreme Court itself has recently relied on administrative law
decisions when reviewing portions of the Manual. In Loving v. United
States, the Court upheld Rule for Courts-Martial 1004(c) under the
non-delegation and intelligible principle doctrines.58 To support its
decision, the Court cited numerous cases concerning the validity of
regulations promulgated by administrative agencies.59
Despite the Supreme Court’s example in Loving, the military courts
generally have not looked to non-military cases and doctrines for guidance.
Conversely, they appear to have seen little connection between the Manual
and other forms of administrative law. In their numerous decisions
reviewing Manual provisions, they have not cited the APA, the Chevron
doctrine,60 or other fundamentals of administrative law. Overlooking these
non-binding, but potentially persuasive sources has made their work more
difficult. In addition, as Part IV will show, it occasionally may have caused
the courts to err.
B. Deference to the President
Administrative agencies enjoy a substantial legal advantage in litigation:
namely, in cases of doubt, the federal courts tend to defer to them. *108

57

See, e.g., Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 78
F.3d 659, 663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996); M ilitary Toxics Project v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 146 F.3d 94 8, 955 (D.C . Cir. 1998).
58
See Loving v. U nited S tates, 51 7 U .S. 74 8, 76 8-73 (1996).
59
In support of its ruling on the non-delegation doctrine, the Supreme Court
cited: United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); Touby v. United States, 500
U.S. 160 (199 1); M. Kraus & Bros., Inc. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614 (1946); and
other decisio ns. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 768 . In add ressing the intelligible princip le
doctrine, the Supreme Court cited: A.L.A. Sch echter Po ultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (19 35); Panama R efining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U .S. 19 0 (1943 ), and other c ases. See
Loving, 517 U.S. at 771.
60
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Reso urces Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). The Chevron doctrine requires the federal courts to defer to an
administrative agenc y when the agency ad opts a reasonable interpretation of a
statute that the agency ad ministers. See id. at 843.
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The federal courts generally uphold regulations passed by agencies, as well
as their interpreting of statutes.61
In an influential article, Justice Antonin Scalia identified three
arguments for judicial deference to administrative agencies.62 First, the
separation of powers principle generally requires courts to cede questions
of policy to the other branches of government.63 Second, Congress
expressly or implicitly may direct and often has directed courts to defer to
agencies.64 Third, agencies have greater substantive expertise in many
areas than the courts.65
These reasons for deferring to administrative regulations, as the
following discussion will show, also apply to the executive orders issued
by the President. Indeed, in the case of executive orders to the military, they
may produce an even stronger argument for deference.66 Courts, therefore,
should hesitate before invalidating Manual provisions.
1. Separation of Powers
Some commentators have argued that courts should defer to administrative agencies because of the separation of powers principle. They have
reasoned that the executive branch, rather than the judiciary, should settle
questions of policy when statutes do not make them clear. Judges,
therefore, should not substitute their judgment for those of the executive
officers controlling the agencies.
This separation of powers concern is heightened in the case of executive
orders. Overruling an agency encroaches on the President’s policy-making
authority, but only indirectly. The President has only limited control over
the regulations issued by administrative agencies. He usually has *109 the

61

See Jona than R . Macey, Separated Pow ers and Positive Political Theory: The
Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GE O. L.J. 671, 703 (19 92); Thomas
W . Merrill, Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Y ALE L.J. 969 , 1017 (199 2).
For discussion of the special rules co ncerning deference in the context of criminal
law, see infra Part IV.G.2.
62
See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 198 9 D UK E L.J . 511 .
63
Id. at 515-16.
64
Id. at 516-17 .
65
Id. at 514.
66
See Ro binson O . Everett, Some Comm ents on the Role of Discretion in
Military Justice, 37 LA W & CONTEMP. PRO BS. 173 , 176-184 (19 72) (discussing
generally the President’s discretion over the content of the rules governing
courts-martial).
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power to hire and to fire the head of the agency,67 but generally cannot
direct its day-to-day operations. For this reason, regulations promulgated
by an agency-although they emanate from the executive branch of
government-may not fully reflect the President’s views or policy choices.
The same caveat holds less true for executive orders. The President has
complete control over the content of executive orders because he alone
signs them. Executive orders, therefore, necessarily embody policy choices
that the President personally has made or approved. Therefore, when a
court invalidates an executive order, it directly challenges the President’s
decisions. Respect for the head of the executive branch, for this reason,
requires that courts take this step only with justification.68 Although they
may strike down Military Rules of Evidence and Rules of Courts-Martial
Procedure for a variety of reasons (described in Part IV), they should defer
to the President’s lawful policy choices.
2. Delegation of Policy-Making Authority
All legislation contains some gaps or open issues. Accordingly, when
Congress requires an agency to administer a statute, commentators have
argued that courts should infer that Congress implicitly has delegated to the
agency the authority to make policy choices.69 Courts must recognize *110
and uphold this implicit delegation, just as they would follow any other
express or implied command in a statute.
67

See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (President may d ischarge
executive officers). But see Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (Congress may limit the power of the President to discharge a member of an
independent agency who exercises quasi-legislative power).
68
One author would disagree somewhat with this argu ment. Euge ne R. Fidell
asserts:
[I]t is error to leave the impression that the role of the P resident is more
than perfunctory in the ado ption of Manual provisions. True, a presidential
signature appears, and the President’s attorneys may have a part in the
review process, but the und eniab le fact is that the essential work in this
regard is performed by the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice.
Fidell, supra note 25, at 6055. Nevertheless, while the President may delegate the
work of putting together the Manual as he delegates most work, by statute he retains
ultimate respo nsibility for its co ntent.
69
See Scalia, supra note 62, at 516 (finding this rationale most persuasive).
Some courts have a ccep ted this reasoning. See, e.g., Process Gas Consum ers Group
v. United States Dep’t of A gric., 69 4 F.2 d 77 8, 791 (D .C. Cir. 1982) (en banc),
cert. denied 461 U .S. 905 (1983 ); Constance v. Secretary of Health & Hum an Serv.,
672 F.2d 990, 995 (1st Cir. 1982).
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The same reasoning applies to the executive orders that establish the
UCMJ, only with more force. The UCMJ assigns to the President the task
of creating rules, and therefore naturally invests some discretion in him. 70
That is not all. The Constitution also designates the President as the
Commander-in-Chief.71 In this role, he has broad discretion in military
matters.72 Courts, therefore, again should not upset his decisions lightly.
3. Expertise
As administrative agencies have expertise in the areas that they regulate,
the President and his advisers have special knowledge about the needs and
concerns of the military. This expertise extends not only to strategic and
operational matters, but also to matters of discipline. Military necessity
requires that the President have discretion to employ his expertise. As
Professor William F. Fratcher explained nearly forty years ago:
Good order, morale, and discipline in the armed forces are necessary to
victory in war; their absence ensure defeat. The President, as Commander-in-Chief, is primarily responsible for the maintenance of order,
morale and discipline in the armed forces and the system of military
justice is one of the principal means of maintaining them. It is essential
to national safety that the President have sufficient power to make the
system of military justice work effectively under the conditions which
actually exist in the forces ....73
Professor Fratcher added that, in recognition of these principals, it “is
to be hoped that” the military courts “will exercise greater judicial restraint
*111 in the exercise of its power to determine that regulations of the
President are invalid.”74
C. Consistency
In reviewing Manual provisions, the courts also should strive to act
consistently and to explain any apparent inconsistencies in their decisions.
Yet, they have not always treated the same types of challenges in a similar

70

See, e.g., Do uglas K miec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the
Decline of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 AD MIN . L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988 );
Kenneth Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
308 -12 (1 986 ).
71
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
72
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772-73 ( 199 6); R eid v. C overt,
354 U.S. 1, 38 (1957).
73
See Fratch er, supra note 25, at 868.
74
Id. at 860.
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manner. For example, in two cases, defendants sought to have Manual
provisions invalidated on grounds that they conflicted with Army regulations. In one decision, the Court of Military Appeals ruled that Manual
provisions preempt service regulations when they conflict.75 In the other
case, however, the Court of Military Appeals struck down the Manual
provision and upheld the regulation.76 The court made no effort to
reconcile these cases, leaving future litigants, and the lower courts with
ambiguous guidance.
The military courts appear to have rendered most of their conflicting
decisions inadvertently. The way to avoid problems of inconsistency, in this
author’s view, lies in enabling the military courts to recognize that they
regularly perform judicial review of the Manual, and that challenges to
rules of evidence and procedure tend to fall into a small set of discernible
categories. Once the military courts see the similarities among the cases,
they can harmonize their decisions. The following part of this article seeks
to aid them in this endeavor.
IV. Grounds for Invalidating Manual Provisions
In preparing this article, the author has attempted to conduct an
exhaustive survey of the challenges to the Manual since the UCMJ was
enacted in 1950. This research has revealed that litigants have asked the
military courts to invalidate Manual provisions on nine principal grounds.
The courts have accepted these challenges in many instances, but rejected
them in others. The following discussion addresses each of these nine *112
grounds, summarizing the leading cases, and then presenting the author’s
own comments and analysis.
A. The Manual Provision is Merely Precatory
Litigants in many cases have asked the military courts not to follow
Manual provisions or passages in the supplementary materials on grounds
that the President did not intend them to have a binding effect. In these
cases, the litigants have characterized the disputed language as “precatory,”

75

See United States v. Kelson, 3 M.J. 139, 140 (C.M .A. 19 77) (invalidating rule
promulgated by the Secretary of the Army as inconsistent with the Manual).
76
See United States v. Johnson, 22 C.M.R. 278, 28 3 (1957 ) (striking down
Manual provision as inconsistent with A rmy reg ulation).
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meaning that it only provides guidance and does not have the force of law. 77
The courts have accepted this challenge in a number of instances.
1. Leading Cases
The cases indicate that two factors determine whether the military
courts will characterize a Manual provision as precatory and thus feel free
not to follow it. The first factor is the provision’s location within the
Manual. The second is the wording of the provision.
The published volume containing the Manual, includes two very
important supplementary materials: the “discussion” accompanying the
Rules for Courts-Martial and Military Rules of Evidence, and the “analyses” of these Rules and the Punitive Articles.78 Military courts frequently
cite and follow these supplementary materials, and judge advocates
constantly rely on them for guidance. Nonetheless, the courts have
characterized everything appearing in these supplementary materials as
precatory, and often have refused to follow what they say.79
Actual Manual provisions--the Rules for Courts-Martial, the Military
Rules of Evidence, and the Punitive Articles-have received different
treatment. Unlike the discussion and analysis, the courts have assumed that
the President generally intended these provisions to be binding unless

77

See BLACK ’S LAW DICT ION ARY 1176 (6th ed. 199 0) (defining
“prec atory” to mean “conveying or embodying a recomm endation or advice or the
expression or a wish, but not a positive command or direction”).
78
See MCM , supra note 7, pmbl. discussion (describing these supplementary
materials).
79
For c ases refusing to fo llowing the discussion, see, e.g., United States v.
Fisher, 37 M .J. 812, 81 8 (N .M.C.M .R. 19 93) (refusing to follow d iscussion of
R .C .M . 305 (h)), affirmed 40 M.J. 293 (C.M.A. 1994); United States v. Robertson,
27 M.J. 741, 74 3 n. 1 (A.C.M.R. 1 988) (re fusing to follow d isc ussion o f R .C .M .
1003(3 )). For c ases refusing to fo llow the analysis, see, e.g., United States v.
Rexroat, 38 M.J. 292, 298 (C.M.A. 1993) (analysis not followe d), cert. denied 510
U.S. 1192 (1994); United States v. Marrie, 39 M.J. 993, 997 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994)
(refusing to follow statement in analysis indicating that R.C.M. 405(g)(1)(A)
created a per se rule), aff’d 43 M .J. 35 (1995). See also United States v. Mance, 26
M.J. 244 , 252 (C.M .A.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 942 (1988) (stating that the analysis
is not binding) ; United States v. White, 39 M.J. 796 (N .M.C.M .R. 1994) (stating
that the analysis is not binding); United States v. Ferguson, 40 M.J. 823, 827
(N.M.C.M.R. 1994) (stating that the analysis is not binding); United States v.
Perillo, 6 M.J. 678, 679 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (app endix 8 to the Manual does not
have the force of law).
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otherwise*113 indicated. The military courts, accordingly, have followed
them except when their language reveals that they merely provide guidance.
Most of the Manual provisions that courts have characterized as
precatory have contained the word “should.” This auxiliary verb often
creates an ambiguity. If a rule says that someone “should” take a particular
action, does the rule mandate that action, or only recommend it? This
question unfortunately has no universal answer.
The characterization of “should” as permissive or mandatory depends
on context.80 In some cases, courts have held that rules containing the word
“should” are precatory.81 In other cases, they have found them to be
binding.82 In still other cases, the courts have raised the issue without
deciding it.83 To present a persuasive argument, litigants must be prepared
*114 to compare these numerous precedents to the particular provision that
they are challenging as precatory.
80
See United States v. Voorhees, 16 C.M .R. 83, 101 (C.M .A. 1954) (holding
that while the word “should” is “normally construed as permissive,” con text may
indicate that it has a “m andatory” meaning). Cf. United States v. Merritt, 1 C.M.R.
56, 61 (1951 ) (“[W]hile the word ‘shall’ is generally construed to mean imperative
and mand atory, it ma y be interpreted to be permissive and directory.”).
81
See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 17 C.M.R. 186, 194 (1954) (holding that
MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 150b was precatory when it stated “the court should
advise an apparently uninformed witness of his right to decline to make any answer
which might tend to incriminate him”); United States v. Hartley, 14 M.J. 890, 898
(N.M.C.M.R. 1982) (holding that M CM 196 9, supra note 7, at A6-A4 was
precatory when it stated: “A person on active duty belonging to a reserve
compo nent ... should be described as such ....”).
82
See, e.g., United States v. Lalla, 17 M.J. 622, 625 (N.M.C.M.R. 1983)
(holding that M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 76b(1) was not precatory when it stated:
“If an additional punishment is authorized because of the provisions of 127c,
Section B, ... the military judge ... should advise the court of the basis of the
increased permissible punishment.”); United States v. Warner, 25 M.J. 64, 67
(C.M.A. 1987) (rejecting the argument that R.C.M. 11 07(d)(2) was precatory when
it stated: “W hen an accused is not serving confinement, the accused should not be
deprived of more than two-thirds pay for any month as a result of one or more
sentences by court-martial ... unless requ ested by the accused.”).
83
See, e.g., Unite d Sta te s v. Fra nc is, 15 M.J . 424, 428 (C .M .A. 1983)
(questioning whether MCM 196 9, supra note 7, P 33h was mand atory or precatory
in stating that all known charges “should” be tried at a single trial); United States
v. Hoxsey, 17 M.J. 964, 965 (A.F.C.M.R. 1984) (suggesting that MCM 1969, supra
note 7, P 1 68 m ight be precatory when it stated that “[i]n general it is considered
objectionable to hold one accountable under [art. 89] for what was said or done by
him in a purely private conversation”).
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Although most cases in which courts have found Manual provisions
precatory have involved rules employing the word “should,” some have not.
For example, in United States v. Jeffress,84 the Court of Military Appeals
concluded that it did not have a duty to follow a portion of the punitive
articles that explained the elements of kidnapping. Although the punitive
articles generally have a binding effect, the court characterized this
particular explanation as non-binding “discussion.”85
Another example of a challenge to a rule that did not use the word
“should” appears in United States v. Solnick.86 In that case, the government
argued against enforcing Rule for Courts-Martial 1107, which directs the
convening authority to act on a sentence unless “it is impracticable.”87 The
government contended that the court should not enforce the provision or its
impracticability requirement on grounds they “are essentially ‘housekeeping’ rules ‘serving no purpose other than to provide guidance to commanders through the post-trial process and assist them in taking action on results
of courts-martial ....”’88 Although the court ultimately rejected the
argument, it seriously considered the government’s position.89
*115
2. Analysis and Comment
At first glance, some observers might think that the military courts
improperly are failing to defer to the President when they refuse to follow
the discussion or analysis printed along with the Manual.90 In reality,
however, they are not. The President played no role in preparing these
84

28 M .J. 409 (C.M.A. 19 89).
See id. (upholding UC MJ art. 92 (c)(2) (W est 1998)). For a similar case, see
United States v. Turner, 42 M.J. 689, 691 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1995). In Turne r,
the court upheld the definition of “dangerous weapon” in UCM J art. 54c(4)(a)(ii),
but did not appear to feel bound by the Manual provision. Instead, it simply agreed
that the de finition was logical. See id. The dissent described the definition in the
Manual as “a nonbinding comment on the law.” Id. at 694 (M ogrid ge, J.,
dissenting).
86
39 M .J. 930 (N .M.C.M .R. 19 94).
87
MCM , supra note 7, R.C.M. 1107.
88
See Solnick, 39 M .J. at 93 3.
89
See id. For another precatory language challenge not involving the word
“should,” see United States v. Latimer, 30 M.J. 554, 562 (A.C.M.R. 1990)
(sugge sting that R .C.M . 911 was precato ry in stating that “[w]hen the trial is by a
court-martial with members, the court-martial is ordinarily assem bled immediately
after the members are sworn”).
90
See supra Part III.B. (arguing that co urts should defer to the President).
85
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supplementary materials, and he did not promulgate them by executive
order; on the contrary, these materials represent only the beliefs of staff
personnel who worked on the Manual.91 The courts, therefore, do not
violate the principle of deference to the President when they disagree with
them.
The discussion accompanying the preamble explains the development
and role of these supplementary sources as follows:
The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the Department of
Transportation, has published supplementary materials to accompany
the Manual for Courts-Martial. These materials consist of a Discussion (accompanying the Preamble, the Rules for Courts-Martial, and
the Punitive Articles), an Analysis and various appendices. These
supplementary materials do not constitute the official views of the
Department of Defense, the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Justice, the military departments, the United States
Courts of Appeals for the Armed Forces, or any other authority of
the Government of the United States, and they do not constitute
rules.92
The analysis of the Rules for Courts-Martial confirms this view of both
the discussion and analysis:
The Discussion is intended by the drafters to serve as a treatise....
The Discussion itself, however, does not have the force of law....The
Analysis sets forth the nonbinding views of the drafters, as well as
the intent of the drafters, particularly with respect to the purpose of
substantial changes in present law.... [I]t is important to remember
that the analysis solely represents the views of staff personnel who
worked on the project, and does not *116 necessarily reflect the view
of the President in approving it, or of the officials who formally
recommended approval to the President.93
The military courts also correctly have presumed that they generally
must follow actual Manual provisions, unless their language suggests
otherwise. Rule for Courts-Martial 101 declares: “These rules govern the
procedures and punishments in all courts-martial ....”94 Military Rule of
Evidence 101 similarly states that the rules of evidence “are applicable in

91

See MCM , supra note 7 , pmb l.
Id.
93
Id. at A21-3.
94
Id. R.C.M. 101 .
92
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courts-martial, including summary courts-martial ....”95 These provisions
reveal that the President generally intended actual Manual provisions to
have the force of law, absent some other indication.
In deciding future cases, however, courts should take care not to dismiss
the supplementary materials as irrelevant. Despite their precatory status, the
courts should not simply ignore them. On the contrary, they generally
should follow the “discussion” and “analysis” for three reasons.
First, the staff who prepared the supplementary material had significant
expertise in the field of military law. 96 They drafted many of the rules in
the Manual, and they attempted to explain the rules as thoroughly as they
could. In cases of doubt, courts generally should assume that the drafters
understand the implications of their statements, and follow their nonbinding
guidance.
Second, judge advocates by necessity often must rely on the supplementary materials although they know (or should know) that they are not
binding. In the field, trial and defense counsel often must give quick advice
without having the opportunity to conduct extensive research. Naturally,
they first turn to the Manual and the material printed with it.97 Consequently,*117 even if courts have no duty to follow precatory parts of the
Manual, disregarding them may have negative practical consequences.
Third, following the precatory language would accord with the
longstanding judicial practice of deferring to an agency’s interpretation of
the statutes that it enforces.98 This doctrine strictly does not apply to the
armed forces, but there is no pressing need for the military courts to have
a different policy. Although the frequency of job rotations prevents many
judge advocates from becoming truly expert in any one legal subject, the
officers who prepared the “analysis” and “discussion” had long-term

95

Id. MIL. R.EVID. 101.
See id. pmb l. & A21-1 .
97
See United States v. Smith, 32 C.M .R. 105, 119 (19 62).
It must be
remembered that in many instance s facilities of legal resea rch are not re adily
available, so it is wholly understandable--perhaps even desirable-- that the Ma nua l,
a handy compend ium on military justice, include statements concerning substantive
principles of law.Id.
98
See Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945) (holding
that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to “controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”); John F.
M anning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 C OL UM . L. RE V. 612, 6 27-3 1 (1996 ).
96
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experience in military criminal law. 99 They thus resembled the staff of
administrative agencies in terms of expertise.
With respect to actual Manual provisions, the courts have done well in
trying to determine what the President intended. When the President
promulgates rules containing words like “should,” he may or may not want
courts to enforce them. Indeed, the President could aid the courts significantly by eliminating the word “should” from future versions of the
Manual.100
B. The Manual Provision Conflicts with the UCMJ
Outside of the military context, the APA permits courts to invalidate
administrative rules and regulations that are “not in accordance with
law.”101 This provision insures that legislation takes precedence over
administratively promulgated materials. Under the APA, courts regularly
strike down federal regulations that conflict with federal statutes.102
Although the APA does not apply to the Manual, the military courts
occasionally*118 have invalidated Manual provisions on the ground that
they conflict with the UCMJ.103
1. Leading Cases
The Court of Military Appeals began to invalidate Manual provisions
that conflicted with the UCMJ shortly after the code went into effect. In
United States v. Wappler,104 the court refused to uphold a Manual

99

See, e.g., MCM, supra note 7, at A22-1 (indicating that then-Major Fred ric
Lederer prepared the initial draft of the analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence).
See also id. at A21-1 through A21-2 (describing the other officers who worked on
the extensive revisions to the Manual in 1984).
100
See OFFICE O F T HE LEG ISLA TIVE CO UN SEL, U.S. HOU SE OF REP.,
HOUSE LEGISLATIVE COUN SEL’S MAN UAL ON D RAFTING ST YLE 61-62
(Ira B. Forester ed., 1995) (recomm ending use of the word “shall”); REED
DICKERSON, LEG ISLA TIVE DR AFT ING 125 -29 (1 954 ) (listing words that
drafters should avo id in creating lega l rules).
101
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(A) (W est 1998).
102
See, e.g., Abington Me morial Hosp. v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1984)
(invalidating a Medicare regulation under section 706(2)(A) on ground s that it
conflicted with federal statutes).
103
See Fidell, supra note 25, at 6050-51 (discussing this type of challenge).
104
9 C.M .R. 23 (1 953 ). Professor F ratcher identifies Wappler as the first case
in which the Military Court of Appeals held a Manual provision inv alid. See
Fratcher, supra note 25, at 870 . But see Fidell, supra note 25, at 6051 n. 17
(qualifying this assertion).
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provision that indicated a court-martial could confine to bread and water a
person not attached to or embarked on a vessel.105 The court found this
provision to conflict with Article 55’s prohibition on cruel or unusual
punishments.106 The court subsequently invalidated a number of other
provisions in the 1951 Manual because the provisions conflicted with
Article 27’s requirement of certified counsel,107 Article 31’s prohibition on
self-incrimination,108 Article 37’s rules on unlawful command influence,109
*119 Article 51’s rules on voting by the panel,110 Article 66’s rules on

105

MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 127b.
10 U.S.C.A. § 855 (W est 1998). Noting that Article 55 affords greater
protection than the Eighth Amendm ent, the court held that the statute prohib its
confinement to bread and w ater except as autho rized in Article 15. See Wap pler, 9
C.M.R. at 26. Because Article 15 authorized confine ment to bread an d water only
for persons attached to or emb arked on vessels, see 10 U.S.C.A. § 15 (b)(2)(A), the
Manual provision violated Article 5 5. See id.
107
United States v. Drain, 16 C.M.R. 220 (1954) (invalidating MCM 1951,
supra note 7, P 11 7a, wh ich said that officers taking depositions need not be
certified counsel, as contrary to article 27(a)).
108
See United States v. Rosato, 11 C.M.R. 143, 145 (1953) (invalidating MCM
1951, supra note 7 , P 15 0, which said that a person can be required to make a
handwriting sample, as contrary to Article 31); United States v. Eggers, 11 C.M.R.
191, 194 (1953) (same ); United States v. Greer, 13 C.M.R. 132, 134 (1953)
(invalidating a statement in M CM 195 1, supra note 7, P 150(b) indicating that
courts may compel an accused to utter words for the purpose of voice identification
as contra ry to Article 31 ); United States v. Kelley, 23 C.M.R. 48, 52 (1957)
(app arently invalidating an unspecified Manual provision on admission of
exculpatory statements as contrary to Article 31); United States v. Price, 23 C.M.R.
54, 56 (1 957 ) (invalidating M CM 195 1, supra note 7, P 140(a), which said that
evidence of a false statement was admissible even if no preliminary warning had
been given, as contrary to Article 31); United S tates v. Haynes, 27 C.M.R. 60, 64
(1958) (invalidating MCM 19 51, supra note 7, P 140a, which said that evidence
found by means of inadm issible co nfession was itself ad missible, as contrary to
Article 31).
109
See United States v. Littrice, 13 C.M.R. 43, 50 (1958) (limiting the use of
MCM 195 1, supra note 7 , P 38 , which denounces theft as a crime of moral
turpitude, so as not to violate Article 37 on unlawful command influence).
110
See United States v. Jones, 22 C.M.R. 73 (1956 ) (invalidating a statem ent in
MCM 195 1, supra note 7 , P 8a ’s “guide to trial procedure,” which said that the law
officer may excused a challenged person, as contrary to Articles 41 and 51); United
States v. Johnpier, 30 C.M.R. 90 , 94 (1 961 ) (invalidating a p rovisio n in M CM
1951, supra note 7, P 55 that specified a pro cedure for suspending trial in order to
obtain the view s of the co nvening authority).
106
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appeal,111 Article 72’s rules regarding suspension of sentences,112 Article
83’s rules on fraudulent enlistments,113 Article 85’s rules on desertion,114
and Article 92’s rules on disobeying orders.115
The conflicts that these cases addressed arose mostly because of a
fundamental problem with the 1951 Manual. That version of the Manual
strived to serve two competing functions. It sought to act not only as a list
of rules but also as a handy treatise to aid judge advocates. The treatise-like
aspects of the Manual simply went too far in many instances.116
A substantial revision of the Manual occurred in 1969.117 Although this
revision made the Manual more compatible with the UCMJ, the Court of
Military Appeals continued to strike down its provisions.
In particular, it invalidated paragraphs as inconsistent with Article 38’s
rules with respect to representation of defense counsel,118 Article 39’s *120

111

See United States v. Varnadore, 26 C.M.R . 251, 256 (19 58) (invalidating
MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 127b, which lim ited co nfinement to six months in the
absence of a punitive discharge, as contrary to Articles 66).
112
See United States v. Cecil, 27 C.M.R. 445, 446 (1959) (invalidating MCM
1951, supra note 7 , P 88 e(2)(b), which allow ed the convening authority to suspend
a sentence without giving the accused probationary status as contrary to Article 72).
113
See United States v. Jenkins, 22 C.M.R. 51 (1956) (invalidating MCM 1951,
supra note 7, P162’s definition of enlistment to includ e “induction” as contrary to
Article 83).
114
See United States v. Cothern, 23 C.M.R. 382 (1957) (invalidating MCM
1951, supra note 7, P 164a ’s inference of an intent to remain absent as contrary to
Article 85).
115
See United States v. Curtin, 26 C.M .R. 207, 211-12 (19 58) (invalidating
MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 171 b, which authorized conviction upon a finding of
“constructive” knowledge, as contrary to Article 92(2)’s requirement of actual
knowledge).
116
See Robert E mmet Quinn, Courts-Martial Practice: A View from the Top, 22
HASTINGS L.J. 201, 206 (1971) (explaining that many provisions of the Manual
were struck down “because the Manual was both deficient an d inefficient in
effectuation of its purpose” and that the Manual’s “principal fault was that it tried
to be an enc yclopedia o f military law, rather than a rule book of practice.”).
117
See supra note 7.
118
See United States v. McFadden, 42 C .M.R. 14, 15-16 (1970) (invalidating
a provision in M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 47 that limited participation of
uncertified assistant counsel as contrary to Article 38 (e)).
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provisions about what may take place at court sessions,119 and Article 54’s
rules with respect to records of trial.120
The 1984 revision, which gave the Manual its present format, largely
succeeded in eliminating existing conflicts. It did not, however, eliminate
them all. For example, in United States v. Davis,121 the Court of Military
Appeals struck down a Rule for Court-Martial purporting to limit matters
that the accused could submit to the convening authority when seeking
clemency. In others instances, the courts have suggested that Manual
provisions might conflict with the UCMJ, but ultimately have avoided
making that determination.122
Ironically, despite the large number of cases in which the military courts
have struck down Manual provisions since the inception of the UCMJ, they
actually have hesitated to find conflicts. In a series of cases, the courts have
interpreted Manual provisions to avoid conflicts even when their interpretations do not comport with the most natural reading of their text. The courts’
practice in these cases resembles the familiar “rule of avoidance” that
requires courts to interpret statutes in ways such that they do not violate the
Constitution.123
119

United States v. McIver, 4 M .J. 900, 90 3-04 (N.M .C.M .R. 19 78) (invalidating a pro vision in M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 152 that prevented judges from
ruling on motions to suppress evidence during a pre-arraignment session as contrary
to Article 39).
120
See United States v. Douglas, 1 M.J. 354, 355 (C.M.A. 1976) (invalidating
portions of M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 145b, which relaxed the rule on admission
of non-verb atim transcripts, as conflicting with Article 54 ).
121
33 M.J. 13, 15 (C.M.A. 1991) (invalidating R.C.M. 1105 as conflicting with
Article 60(b)(1)).
122
See, e.g., United States v. Francis, 25 M.J. 614, 618-19 (C.G.C.M.R. 1987)
(discussing possible conflict betwe en M ilitary Rule of Evidenc e 103(a) and A rticle
66).
123
See, e.g., Blodgett v. Ho lden, 2 75 U .S. 14 2, 14 8 (1927 ) (Ho lmes, J.,
concurring); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 , 269 (1886). See gen erally Adrian
Vermeule, Savings Con structions, 85 GEO . L.J. 1945 (1997). Outside of military
law, no doc trine says tha t courts must interpret regulation s to avo id conflicts with
statutes.
Instead, the Supreme Court has made clear that federal courts must invalidate
regulations that conflict with statutes. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). In some cases, the
courts do inte rpret ambiguous regulations to avoid conflicts with statutes. See Joy
Tec hnologies, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 99 F.3d 991, 994 (10th Cir. 1996). The
military courts, howe ver, seem to have gone farther, and have extended this practice
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An early example of interpreting the Manual to avoid conflicts comes
from the 1952 case of United States v. Clark.124 A provision in the Manual
*121 specified that the law officer “may advise” a court-martial of lesser
included offenses.125 The Court of Military Appeals interpreted this
provision to mean “must advise” the court, because a contrary interpretation
would conflict with Article 51.126 Subsequent cases have continued this
effort to avoid conflicts even when it requires the court to adopt an
unnatural or strained reading of a Manual provision.127
2. Analysis and Comment
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o make [r]ules for the
[[[g]overnment and [r]egulation of the land and naval forces.”128 Congress
effectively would lack that power if the President could use executive
orders to contradict legislation. The military courts have acted properly in
allowing parties to challenge Manual provisions that conflict with the
UCMJ.129 The courts similarly might invalidate Manual provisions that
conflict with federal legislation other than the UCMJ.
Statutory support for the courts’ practice of striking down Manual
provisions that conflict with the UCMJ comes from Article 36.130 Article
36 specifies that the President may prescribe rules of procedure and
evidence for courts-martial.131 The article, however, insists that the rules
prescribed “shall not be contrary to or inconsistent with this code.”132
Courts thus have an implicit statutory basis for striking down procedural
and evidentiary provisions in the Manual if they conflict with the UCMJ.

to Manual provision that do appea r ambiguo us.
124
2 C.M .R. 107 (1952 ).
125
MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 73c.
126
See Clark, 2 C.M .R. at 109-1 10.
127
See, e.g., United States v. LaGrange, 3 C.M.R. 76, 79 (1952); United States
v. Marrie, 39 M .J. 993, 997 (A.F.C.M .R. 1994).
128
U.S. CO NS T. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 4.
129
Other commentators also agree that statutory provisions take precedence over
the Ma nua l. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL X (2d ed. 1986 ) (stating that Manual provisions m ust fall
if they conflict with a sta tu te); EDW A RD M . BRYN E, MILITARY LAW 12 (3d
ed. 1981) (stating that Manual provisions m ust fall if they conflict with a statute);
Fratcher, supra note 2 5, at 86 6 (discussing in dep th the question of when
presidential orders and congressional statutes take precedence over each other).
130
10 U .S.C.A . § 83 6 (W est 1998).
131
See id.
132
Id.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MANUAL FOR COURTS -MARTIAL

27

The military courts, however, do not stand on as firm ground when they
interpret Manual provisions to avoid conflicts with statutes. *122 Although
courts traditionally have interpreted federal statutes in ways to avoid
constitutional questions, they generally have not sought to avoid conflicts
between regulations and statutes. 133 Courts avoid striking down statutes
because Congress passes laws only after great effort and because legislation
generally reflects democratic choices. The same concern has less force in
the area of administrative law. The President, unilaterally, issues the
Manual by executive order. If its provisions conflict with the acts of
Congress, they should fall. Invalidating Manual provisions does not create
a substantial problem because the President easily can replace the stricken
portions with new provisions that do not conflict with the statute. The
military courts, accordingly, should reconsider their practice of adopting
unnatural or strained interpretations of the Manual to prevent conflicts
from arising with the UCMJ.134
C. The Manual Provision Conflicts with Another Manual Provision.
The Manual contains hundreds of pages of rules. Not surprisingly, a few
of these rules have come into conflict with each other. In these situations,
the military courts have to decide what to apply and what to ignore.
1. Leading Cases
The Court of Military Appeals recognized early that one Manual
provision might clash with another. In a frequently cited passage, the court
suggested that such a conflict might require the military courts to choose
not to enforce one of the two provisions.135 Subsequent lower-court cases
have announced two rules for determining which Manual provision should
prevail.
First, in United States v. Morlan, the Army Board of Review ruled that
when a specific provision in the Manual conflicts with a general provision,
the “specific terminology controls and imparts meaning to [the] *123
133

See supra note 123.
This conclusion applies only to cases where courts adopt interpretations that
are contrary to the ord inary meaning of Manual provisions. In cases o f ambiguity,
the courts may decide that an interpretation that avoids a co nflict is best because the
President most likely intende d to comp ort with the statute.
135
See United States v. Villasenor, 19 C.M.R. 129, 133 (1955) (“[W] here a
[Manual] provision does not lie outside the scope of the authority of the President,
offend against the Uniform Code, co nflict with another well-recognized princip le
of military law, or clash with other Manual provision s, we are duty bound to accord
it full weight.” (emphasis added)).
134
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general terminology.”136 Applying this rule, the Board of Review decided
that a court-martial had improperly sentenced a warrant officer to a
bad-conduct discharge.137 Although paragraph 127c of the 1951 Manual
said generally that a “bad conduct discharge may be given in any case
where a dishonorable discharge is given,” paragraph 126d said more
specifically that “separation from the service of a warrant officer by
sentence of court-martial is effected by dishonorable discharge.”138
Second, in United States v. Valente, the Coast Guard Board of Review
held that when Manual provisions clash, “the pertinent paragraphs should
be read together and, if possible, the conflict resolved in accord with the
overall intent of the Manual.”139 The Board used this standard in a case in
which a court-martial had sentenced an accused to a bad-conduct discharge
and confinement at hard labor for one year, but the convening authority
conditionally had remitted the bad-conduct discharge.140 In reviewing the
legality of the convening authority’s action, the Board had to consider three
conflicting provisions in the 1951 Manual.141
Paragraph 88e(2)(b) appeared to authorize what the convening authority
had done by stating that the convening authority “may suspend the
execution of a punitive discharge.”142 Paragraph 88c, however, said that the
convening authority could remit part of a sentence only if a court-martial
could have imposed the remaining punishment.143 A court-martial could
not have imposed a sentence of confinement at hard labor for one year
without a punitive discharge because paragraph 127b barred a court-martial
from ordering confinement at hard labor for more then six months absent
a punitive discharge.144
Although the Board of Review did not fully explain its reasoning, it
concluded that the Manual prohibited the sentence.145 The Board ruled that
the overall intent of the Manual was to prohibit confinement with hard
136

United States v. Morlan, 24 C.M.R. 390, 392 (A.B.R. 195 7). See also United
States v. Dowty, 46 M.J. 845, 848 n. 10 (N .M. Ct. Crim. App. 1997 ) (stating this
same cano n of co nstructio n), aff’d 48 M .J. 102 (1998 ).
137
See Morlan, 24 C.M.R. at 392.
138
See id. (quo ting M CM 195 1, supra note 7 , PP 126 d, 12 7).
139
United States v. Valente, 6 C.M .R. 476 (C.G.B .R. 1952).
140
See id. at 476.
141
See id.
142
MCM 195 1, supra note 7 , P 88 (e)(2)(b).
143
See id. P 88c.
144
See id. P 127b.
145
See Valente, 6 C.M.R. at 476.
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*124 labor for more than six months without a punitive discharge.146 It,
therefore, remitted the portion of the accused’s confinement in excess of six
months, while retaining the conditionally remitted bad-conduct
discharge.147 Few other cases have identified conflicts within the
Manual.148
2. Analysis and Comment
The two rules in Valente and Morlan for resolving conflicts between
Manual provisions comport with the first two of the general principles for
judicial review discussed above.149 The court in Valente adopted a general
canon of construction that both military and nonmilitary courts have
applied in the context of conflicting laws.150 The court in Morlan,
moreover, afforded respect to the President by striving foremost to
determine the overall intent of the Manual when reconciling disagreeing
provisions.
On the other hand, the two decisions appear slightly inconsistent. In
particular, the Coast Guard Board of Review might have reached a different
result in Valente if it had considered the cannon that the Army Board of
Review applied in Morlan. The Coast Guard Board of Review might have
seen paragraph 88e(2) as the most specific provision, and thus held that it
trumped paragraphs 127b and 88c. If the Board had reached this conclusion, it would have upheld the convening authority’s action.
To reduce inconsistency, the military courts might prioritize their rules
for addressing conflicts within the Manual. For example, they could decide
first to apply the canon in Morlan, determining whether one Manual
provision is more specific than another. Usually, they will have little
difficulty with this issue. If, however, the Morlan canon does not resolve

146

See id.
See id.
148
Cf. United States v. McCray, 15 M .J. 1086, 1089 (A .C.M.R. 198 3) (rejecting
argument that Military Rule of Evidence 609 conflicts with Military Rule of
Evidence 403 ); but see Green v. Bock Laun dry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 526
(1989) (holding that Federal Rule of E vidence 60 9 trum ps Fe deral Rule of Evidence
403 ).
149
See supra Part III.A., B.
150
See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1992)
(stating that Manual provisions must fall if they conflict with a statute); United
S tate s v. D ow ty, 4 6 M .J . 8 45, 8 48 n. 1 0 (N .M . Ct. Crim. App. 1997) (stating that
Manual provisions m ust fall if they conflict with a statute), aff’d 48 M.J. 102
(1998).
147
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the case, the courts then could pursue the Valente case’s inquiry into the
more difficult issue of the “general intent” of the Manual. Although this
*125 example shows one possible way to prioritize, the courts probably
should wait until they review more cases before deciding the best order for
applying rules that address internal Manual conflicts. Although prioritizing
will not eliminate all inconsistency in decisions, it should alleviate the
problem.
D. The Manual Provision Conflicts with a Regulation
A great deal of administrative law outside of the Manual affects service
members. The secretaries of the Departments of Defense and Transportation have statutory authority to pass a variety of regulations that affect the
Armed Forces.151 The secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
moreover, have authority under both statutes and the Manual to pass rules
and regulations.152 In addition, the judge advocate generals of the various
services and the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces also have power
under the Manual to prescribe rules.153
Sometimes the Manual may conflict with other regulations. In these
instances, the military courts have had to determine whether the Manual or
the regulations should prevail. This question, unfortunately, has no easy or
universal answer.
1. Leading Cases
In United States v. Kelson, the Court of Military Appeals upheld a
Manual provision that clashed with an Army regulation.154 In that case, the
accused had moved to dismiss a specification as multiplicious. 155 The
military trial judge refused to entertain the motion because the accused had

151

See, e.g., 10 U.S.C.A. § 580(e)(6) (West 1998) (delegation to the Secretaries
of Defense and Transpo rtation).
152
See, e.g., id. § 210 2(b)(3) (statutory d elegation of the authority to the service
secretaries); MCM, supra note 7, R.C.M. 106 (Manual delegation o f authority to
service secretaries). The Secretary of Transportation sometimes acts with respect
to the Co ast Guard in a cap acity equivalent to the service secretaries. See 10
U.S.C.A. § 10 1(a)(9)(D ) (defining “secretary concerned” to include the service
secretaries and Secretary of Transp ortation).
153
See, e.g., MCM , supra note 7, R.C.M. 109(a) (delegation to the Judge
Advocate Generals), R.C .M. 1204 (a) (delegation to the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Fo rces).
154
United States v. Kelson, 3 M .J. 139 (C.M.A. 19 77). See Fidell, supra note
25, at 6050 (discussing the Kelson decisio n).
155
See Kelson, 3 M.J. at 139-40.
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not put it in writing before the Article 39(a) session as Army Regulation
27-10 then required.156 The Court of Military Appeals reversed, concluding
*126 that the regulation conflicted with paragraph 66b of the 1969
Manual,157 which said that failure to assert a motion to dismiss in a timely
manner did not waive the accused’s rights.158 Similarly, in Keaton v. Marsh,
the Army Court of Criminal Appeals invalidated a provision of Army
Regulation 27-10 that conflicted with Rule for Courts-Martial 305(l).159
In another case, however, the Court of Military Appeals refused to
follow a Manual provision that conflicted with a regulation. In United
States v. Johnson, a soldier accused of desertion defended his absence on
grounds that he had possessed a valid pass.160 Relying on paragraph 164a
of the 1951 Manual, the government argued that the accused had abandoned his pass by his conduct, and thus was absent without authority. 161
The court sided with the accused. Examining the Army regulation
governing passes, the court concluded that a soldier had no power to alter
or abandon his pass.162 It thus rejected the Manual’s statement that a
soldier could abandon a pass.163 One dissenting judge would have upheld
the Manual.164
2. Analysis and Comment
It is tempting to think that the Manual always should prevail over other
rules and regulations because the Manual emanates from a higher authority.
After all, the President issues the Manual, while subordinate secretaries and
officers issue all other rules regulations. At least one military judge appears
to have adopted this hierarchical theory, stating: “When a regulation
promulgated by one of the Armed Forces directly conflicts with a Manual

156

See id.
See id. at 141; U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27-10, LEGAL SERVICES:
MILIT ARY JUST ICE (8 Aug. 19 94) [hereinafter AR 27-10].
158
See Kelson, 3 M .J. at 14 1.
159
See Keaton v. Marsh, 43 M.J. 757, 760 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 1996) (holding
that Army Regulation 27-10 conflicted with R .C.M . 395 (l) in purporting to
authorize reconfinement in the absence of new evidence or misconduct).
160
United States v. Johnson, 22 C.M .R. 27 8, 28 2 (1957 ).
161
See id. at 282.
162
See id. at 283 (citing Army Regulation 630-10).
163
See id.
164
See id. at 286 (La timer, J., d issenting).
157
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provision implemented by Executive Order, the conflicting provisions of
that regulation are invalid.”165
The relationship of the Manual to other regulations, however, requires
a more sophisticated analysis. In particular, in cases of conflict, *127
whether the Manual or regulation should prevail depends on the authority
for the Manual provision and the authority for the regulation. As the
following discussion will explain, Manual provisions generally should
prevail over regulations promulgated by executive officers pursuant to
authority delegated by the President. Whether the Manual should prevail
over regulations promulgated by executive branch officers pursuant to
statutory delegations depends on the relationship of the statutes to the
UCMJ. Regulations, nevertheless, always should prevail over the precatory
portions of the Manual.a. Regulations Passed by Executive Branch Officers
under Authority Delegated by the President
The President has delegated some of his authority under the UCMJ to
subordinates. In various provisions in the Manual, he has instructed the
service secretaries and the judge advocate generals to pass rules and
regulations.166 When a conflict arises between the Manual and these rules
and regulations, the Manual should prevail. Courts should presume that the
President did not grant subordinates authority to negate the Manual
provisions that he has issued by executive order.
The Kelson and Keaton cases provide excellent examples. The Secretary
of the Army passed Army Regulation 27-10 under authority granted by the
President in the Manual.167 Accordingly, when portions of the regulation
conflict with the Manual, the regulation must fall. The President would not
have delegated authority to the Secretary of the Army to prescribe rules for
implementing the Manual that contradict the Manual.b. Regulations Passed
by Executive Branch Officers Pursuant to Statutory Authority
The Secretaries of Defense and Transportation and the various service
secretaries prescribe some regulations pursuant to authority conferred *128
directly by statute, instead of delegated by the President. In these instances,
no simple rule can determine whether the regulations or the Manual should
165

United States v. Schmenk, 11 M.J. 803, 808-09 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981) (M iller,
J., dissenting) (asserting, while addressing an issue the majority did not reach, that
an Air Force Regulation creating a privilege for a records in a drug abuse program
violated Military Rule of Evidence 501).
166
See 10 U .S.C.A. § 940 (W est 1998) (authorizing this delegation from the
President); supra notes 1 51-5 2 (provid ing example s of delegations).
167
See AR 27-1 0, supra note 157, para. 1.1.
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prevail in cases in conflict. Instead, courts must determine what Congress
intended. They must compare the UCMJ to the other statutes in question.
They must ask whether Congress would have wanted regulations passed by
the President under the UCMJ to prevail or vice versa.
Under this standard, the Court of Military Appeals probably reached the
correct result in Johnson. Although the Court did not use this reasoning, the
court could have determined that Congress did not intend the UCMJ to
serve as the primary law on the validity of soldiers’ passes. Passes, in
general, have nothing to do with military justice. Accordingly, the court
properly could have decided that the Army regulation on passes (issued
pursuant to another statute) should take precedence over a Manual
provision.c. Supplementary Materials
While regulations may or may not trump Manual provisions, they
always should prevail over the supplementary materials in the Manual. The
President, as noted above, did not promulgate the “discussion” or “analyses” accompanying the Manual, and the courts properly have characterized
them as merely precatory. 168 Accordingly, this supplementary material
must fall to regulations that do have the force of law.
E. The President Lacked Authority to Promulgate the Manual Provision
The APA allows courts to strike down federal regulations promulgated
“in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right.”169 Outside of the military context, litigants frequently
invoke this provision to challenge administrative law. They argue that
Congress never delegated authority to an agency to make the rules or
regulations, and therefore seek to have them invalidated.170 Although the
*129 APA does not apply to executive orders, litigants often challenge
Manual provisions on essentially the same grounds.171
1. Leading Cases
An early example of the argument that the President lacked authority to
promulgate a Manual provision appears in United States ex. rel. Flannery

168

See supra Part IV.A .
5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (2)(C) (W est 1998).
170
See, e.g., MC I Telecomm . Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
233 (1994) (holding that the FCC did not have authority to promulgate a regulation
eliminating a rate filing requirement).
171
See Fidell, supra note 25, at 6050-54 (discussing what falls within the scope
of article 36).
169
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v. Commanding General, Second Service Command.172 In that case, the
President declared in a pre-UCMJ version of the Manual that discharges
obtained by fraud could be canceled.173 A federal district court invalidated
the provision on the grounds that the President lacked authority to
promulgate it.174 The Articles of War, according to the court, “authorize[d]
the President not to declare substantive law but only to prescribe rules of
procedure.”175
The military courts more recently have invalidated a variety of Manual
provisions on grounds that the President exceeded his authority under the
UCMJ. Many of the cases have involved idiosyncratic issues. 176 Two
principles of general application, however, have emerged with respect to
the President’s authority.
First, the cases have indicated that the President does not have power to
redefine the elements of punitive articles and thus change substantive
criminal law.177 For example, in United States v. Johnson, the accused was
172

69 F . Supp. 66 1 (S.D .N.Y . 194 6).
See id. at 663.
174
See id.
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 27 C.M.R. 303, 305 (195 9) (invalidating
MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 126e which called for automatic reduction in grade
following conviction of certain offenses); United States v. Rapolla, 34 M.J. 1268
(A.F.C.M.R. 1992) (invalida ting M CM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 46c(1)(b), which
stated that larceny by wrongful withholding may arise “whether the person
withholding the property acquired it lawfully or unlawfully” on grounds that the
president lacked authority to define substantive crimes); United States v. Douglas,
1 M.J. 354 (C.M .A. 19 76) (invalidating M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 145b, which
relaxed the rules on admission of non-verbatim transcripts o n grounds that it
exceeded the authority granted in article 3 6).
177
See United States v. Omick, 30 M.J. 1122 (N .M.C.M .R. 1989) (ignoring the
definition of “distrib ute” in M CM , supra note 7, P 37c(3), and stating that the
“meaning and effect of this additional phrase need not be determined b ecause in
areas of substantive criminal law, the President has no authority to prescribe binding
rules”); United States v. Everett, 41 M.J. 847, 852 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994) (stating that
the President does not have authority to establish substantive rules of criminal law,
but may establish a sentencing hierarchy); United States v. Sullivan, 36 M.J. 574,
577 & n.3 (A.C.M.R. 19 92), overruled by United States v. Turner, 42 M.J. 689
(Army Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (invalidating the last sentence of M CM , supra note,
pt. IV, P 54c(4)(a)(ii), which states that a dangerous weapon does not include an
unloaded pistol on grounds that President’s autho rity is limited to matters of
procedure and evidence and “does not include the power to exclude form the
definition of ‘dangerous weapon ’ those unload ed pistols used as firearm s”). See
173
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charged with conspiracy in violation of Article 81.178 In reviewing the case,
the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review decided that it did not
have to follow Part IV, paragraph 5c(1), which stated a rule for conspirators*130 who join on-going conspiracies.179 The court explained that
“[w]hether an accused may be held criminally liable for the overt act
alleged is a substantive issue. Therefore, we are not bound to follow the
statement set forth in paragraph 5(c) ....”180
Second, the courts have held that the President cannot use his power to
specify offenses under Article 134 (the general punitive article),181 to reach
conduct covered by the more specific articles. For example, in United
States v. McCormick, the accused assaulted a twelve-year-old boy.182 The
United States charged him with violation of Article 134, instead of Article
128, which prohibits assaults. The court ruled that the Article 134 charge
was improper, stating: “Congress has acted fully with *131 respect to this
offense by passage of ... Article 128. Hence, the statute is pre-emptive of
the general article.”183
Despite these contrary cases, most claims that the President lacked
authority to pass Manual provisions fail. The principal reason for the lack
of success is that the UCMJ grants the President broad authority. Article
36, as noted above, authorizes the President to create procedural and
evidentiary rules.1 8 4
Articles 18 and 56
also United States v. Jones, 19 C.M.R. 961, 968 n.12 (A.C.M .R. 1955) (expressing
doubt that the President as commander in chief has authority to prescribe
“substantive rules”); United States v. Perry, 22 M.J. 669, 670 n.2 (A.C.M.R. 1986)
(expressing doubt that the P resident as commander in chief has authority to
prescribe “substantive rules” in connection with MCM 1969, supra note 7, P 1 99a ’s
discussion of the elements of the crime of rape).
178
25 M .J. 878, 88 4 (N .M.C.M .R. 19 88).
179
See id.
180
See id.
181
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 934 (W est 1998).
Though not specifically mentioned
in this chap ter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the
armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital, of which perso ns subject to this
chap ter may b e guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall
be punished at the discretion of tha t court.Id.
182
United States v. M cCo rmick, 30 C .M.R. 26 (1960).
183
Id.
184
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 83 6(a).
Pretrial, trial, and p ost-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for
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further authorize the President to set the limits on punishments for violating
the punitive articles of the UCMJ. 185 Nearly everything in the Manual falls
within one of these categories.186
A good example of this principle appears in Loving v. United States.187
In that case, the accused challenged the procedures by which he *132
received the death penalty.188 He argued in part that the President lacked
statutory authority to promulgate a rule specifying the aggravating
circumstances justifying capital punishment.189 The Supreme Court

cases arising under this chapter triab le in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and procedures for courts of inquiry, may
be prescribed by the President by regulations which shall, so far as he
considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States
district courts, but which may not b e con trary to or incon sistent with this
chapter. Id.
See gen erally United States v. Sm ith, 32 C .M.R. 10 5, 11 4 (1962 ) (discu ssing
the history of Article 36 and its p redecesso rs under the A rticles of W ar).
185
See 10 U .S.C.A . § 81 8 (“[G ]eneral courts-martial have jurisdiction to try
persons subject to this chapter for any offense made punishable by this chapter and
may, under such limitations as the President may prescribe, adjudge any punishment
not forbid den by this cha pter, including the penalty of death wh en specifically
authorized by this cha pter.”); id. § 856(a) (“The p unishment which a court-martial
may direct for an offense may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe
for that offense.”).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Newcomb, 5 M .J. 4, 7 (C.M .A. 19 78) (Cook, J.,
concurring) (“W hen C ongress defines military crimes and provid es for their
prosecution by courts-martial, but does not particularize all procedures necessary
to achiev e its purpose, the President, or his subordinates in the military departments,
must formulate rules”); United States v. Lucas, 1 C.M.R. 19, 21 (1951) (upholding
MCM 1951, supra note 7, P 73(b), which required the law officer to give the charge
where a guilty plea has been entered, even though the Code does not impose such
a requirement); United States v. Morlan, 24 C.M.R. 390, 394 (A.B.R. 1957)
(upholding 195 1 M CM , supra note 7, P 126d which precluded warrant officers
from receiving bad conduct discharges, as not in excess of the President’s powers
unde r Article 56).
187
517 U .S. 748 (1996 ).
188
See id. at 769-771.
189
See id.
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rejected this argument, finding authority for the rule in Articles 18, 36, and
56.190
Challenges to the President’s authority also fail because, even in the
absence of statutory authority, the President may have inherent power as
Commander-in-Chief to issue orders that affect courts-martial. In Swaim v.
United States, a former Judge Advocate General of the Army sued the
United States for his pay after a court-martial suspended him.191 He argued,
among other things, that the President had convened the court-martial
without statutory authority.192 The Court, however, held that “it is within
the power of the president of the United States, as commander in chief, to
validly convene a general court-martial” even though the Articles of War
did not grant such power.193
The Court in Swaim did not indicate what limits, if any, exist on the
President’s power to act with respect to courts-martial absent statutory
authority. This issue remains unresolved. In Reid v. Covert, a plurality of
the Supreme Court subsequently stated: “[I]t has not yet been definitely
established to what extent the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, or his delegates, can promulgate, supplement or change
substantive military law as well as the procedures of the military courts in
time of peace, or in time of war.”194

190

Id. at 770. Two years later in United States v. Scheffer, Justice Stevens
asserted in dissent that the President lacked po wer to under Article 36 to promulga te
Military Rule of Evidence 70 7 banning admission of polygraph evidence. See
United States v. Scheffer, 118 S . Ct. 12 61, 1 271 (1998) (Steve ns, J., dissenting).
191
Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 499 (1897). The court-martial
convicted Brigadier General Swaim of conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentlemen in connection with a questionable business transaction. See Major
General Thom as H. Green, History of The Judge Advocate General’s Department,
ARMY LAW., June 1975, at 13, 17.
192
Swaim, 165 U.S. at 555-56. The Articles of W ar allow ed the President to
convene a court-martial in situations in which the ord inary co nvening authority was
disqualified beca use he was the accuser or prosecuto r. See id. In Swaim, the
ordinary conv ening authority--Gene ral She ridan-- could have convened the
court-martial. See id. at 556.
193
See id. at 558.
194
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 38 (1957). The Co urt saw d ifficulties with
allowing the President to make substantive rules. The Court said:
If the President
can provide rules of substantive law as well as procedure, then he and his military
subordinates exercise legislative, executive and judicial powers with respe ct to
those subject to military trials. Such blending of functions in one branch of the
Governm ent is the objectionable thing which the draftsmen of the Constitution
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A more recent recognition of the President’s inherent authority appears
in United States v. Ezell.195 Paragraph 152 of the 1969 Manual gave
commanding officers authority to issue search warrants.196 The *133
defendant argued that no provision of the UCMJ authorized this paragraph,
because it dealt with neither court-martial procedures nor evidence.197 The
Court of Military Appeals stated:
While there may be doubt that paragraph 152 of the Manual for
Courts-Martial represents a proper exercise of the President’s
Article 36 powers, we shall consider the lawfulness of paragraph 152
as an exercise of the powers conferred upon the President by Article
II of the Constitution of the United States as Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces.198
The court, therefore, upheld the rule as properly promulgated. 199 Other
cases have expressed similar views about the President’s inherent power.200
2. Analysis and Comment
The military courts have properly recognized that the President has
broad power to pass procedural and sentencing rules. Articles 18, 36, and
56, by their express terms, confer this authority. Nearly everything in the
present version of the Manual falls within these categories: Part II includes
the Military Rules of Evidence, Part III contains the Rules for *134
Courts-Martial, Part IV specifies the sentences for the punitive articles, and
Part V describes non-judicial punishment. For this reason, it should come
as little surprise if courts can reject most claims that the President lacked
authority to promulgate a Manual provision. Although these articles may
not allow the President to make substantive criminal law or redefine the
elements of crimes, he rarely has attempted to do that.

endeavored to prevent by providing for the separation o f governme ntal powers.Id.
at 38-39. For further discussion of the P resident’s powers as Commander-in-Chief,
see Yo ungstown Sheet & Tube C o. v. Sa wyer, 343 U .S. 57 9 (1952 ). See also
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 767 (1996) (holding that Congress does not
have exclusive power to create rules for the military justice system).
195
6 M .J. 307 (C.M.A. 19 79).
196
See MCM 196 9, supra note 7 , P 15 2.
197
See Ezell, 6 M.J. at 316.
198
Id. at 317-18 .
199
See id. Congress subsequently amended Article 36 to cover “[p] retrial”
procedures ex pressly. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 83 6 (W est 1998).
200
See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 21 M.J. 856, 871 (A.C.M.R. 1986)
(assum ing that the President has inherent authority to abate se ntence s).
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The scope of the President’s power to create rules without UCMJ
authority remains contested. Most scholars believe that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, has very broad power to make rules governing
military justice. Professor Frederick B. Wiener, for example, has asserted
that the President did not need UCMJ authority to promulgate the Manual.
He has stated:
[Articles 36 and 56] do not involve any delegation by Congress; to the
contrary, they constitute recognition that the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces through direct and explicit
constitutional grant.... [T]he President would have power to prescribe
much of what is now in the manual even without the present express
authorizations in the code ....201
Professors Edward S. Corwin, William F. Fratcher, and Clinton Rossiter
have expressed the same view.202
Not everyone agrees, however, that the President has authority to pass
rules beyond what the UCMJ authorizes. Professor Ziegel W. Neff, for
*135 example, has written a thoughtful essay expressing the contrary
view.203 He asserts that the Framers of the Constitution never intended for
the President to have plenary power over military justice,204 that Presidents
have not exercised such power,205 and that such power runs contrary to the
intent of Congress in enacting the UCMJ.206

201

W iener, supra note 25, at 361.
See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS
316 (3d ed. 1948) (“Also, in the absence of conflicting legislation [the P resident]
has powers of his own” to promulgate rules and regulations for the internal
government of the land and naval forces.”); CLINTON ROSSITER, THE
S UP RE M E C OU RT AN D TH E C OM MANDER IN CH IEF 109 (1951) (stating
that Swa in stands for the proposition that “the exercise of discretion by the
President as the fountainhead of military justice is not to be questioned in courts of
the United S tates”); Fratcher, supra note 25, at 862-63. [U]n les s re s tricte d by
express statute, the P resident has power, unde r the Constitution alone, without
statutory authorization, to issue regulations defining offenses within the armed
forces, prescribing the punishments for them, constituting tribunals to try for such
offenses, and fixing the mode of procedure and methods of review of the proceedings of such tribunals.Id.
203
See Ziegel W . Neff, Presidential Power to Reg ulate Military Justice, 30
JUD GE A DV OCA TE J. 6 (1960).
204
See id. at 6-11 .
205
See id. at 12.
206
See id. at 12-13.
202
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Were it not for the Supreme Court’s decision in Swaim, Professor Neff’s
argument might “carry the day.” The Constitution grants Congress the
power to regulate the land and naval forces.207 Congress exercised this
power in the UCMJ. By specifying in Articles 18, 36, and 56 the kinds of
military justice rules that the President can promulgate, ordinary statutory
analysis would suggest that Congress preempted any inherent presidential
power to issue other rules. The Swaim decision, however, rejected the idea
of preemption, and held that the President had authority beyond that
conferred by Congress. Accordingly, until the Supreme Court limits or
overrules Swaim, the military courts must consider the possibility that the
President has power to pass rules in excess of what the UCMJ expressly
grants.
F. The Manual Provision is Arbitrary or Capricious
Litigants occasionally have challenged Manual provisions for being
arbitrary or capricious. Their claims resemble those of litigants contesting
federal regulations on the same grounds under the APA.208 The cases
considering this type of challenge fall into two categories. Some decisions
suggest that the arbitrariness or capriciousness of a Manual provision does
not matter. Others, however, indicate that the courts will not enforce
arbitrary or capricious Manual provisions.*136
1. Leading Cases
The Court of Military Appeals upheld an admittedly arbitrary rule in
United States v. Lucas.209 In that case, although the accused had pleaded
guilty to an offense stemming from an unexcused absence, he sought
reversal of his conviction.210 He argued that the law officer had not
instructed the court-martial about the burden of proof as required by
paragraph 73(b) of the 1951 Manual.211 This instruction would have served
little purpose given the accused’s guilty plea. The Court of Military
Appeals, however, reversed the conviction.212 It explained: “While we may
be unable to ascertain any virtue in the [Manual’s] requirement, we cannot

207

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
See 5 U.S.C.A. § 70 6 (W est 1998) (authorizing courts to set aside regulations
that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law”).
209
1 C.M .R. 19, 22 (1951 ).
210
See id. at 21-22.
211
See id. at 22.
212
See id. at 25.
208
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ignore the plain language used.”213 Other decisions have shown a similar
reluctance to review Manual provisions for arbitrariness or capriciousness.214
The Supreme Court, however, considered the substance of a Manual
provision in United States v. Scheffer. 215 In that case, the accused asked the
Supreme Court to strike down Military Rule of Evidence 707(a) on grounds
that it arbitrarily banned polygraph evidence.216 Citing non-military
precedents, the Court declared that an evidence rule cannot arbitrarily
“infringe[] upon a weighty interest of the accused.”217 Ultimately, however,
the Court upheld the rule.218 It explained that the government has a
legitimate interest in excluding unreliable evidence and that “there is
simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable.”219 Other
decisions *137 similarly have reviewed Manual provisions for arbitrariness
or capriciousness.220

213

Id. at 22.
See, e.g., United States v. Kunak, 17 C.M .R. 346, 355 (19 54) (upholding the
1951 Manual provisions on insanity); United States v. Smith, 32 C.M.R. 105,
119-120 (1962) (upholding M CM 195 1, supra note 7, P 140a, which prohibited
convictions based on uncorrob orated confessions but resting the “decision on the
ground that regulations within a prope rly delegated legislative authority have the
force of law” rather than the wisdom of the rule); United States v. Timmerman, 28
M.J. 531 , 535 (A.F.C.M .R. 1987) (upholding R.C.M. 1102(d), which limited
proceedings in revisions, even though the court said that the rule produced a result
that was “most unfortunate, and a situation we are not sure was intended, or for that
matter even c onsidered when the pre sent Manual was being drafted.” ).
215
118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
216
See at 1265.
217
See id.
218
See id. at 1264.
219
Id.
220
See, e.g., United States v. Ettleson, 13 M .J. 348, 360 (C.M .A. 1982) (holding
that the table o f maxim um punishm ent in M CM 196 9, supra note 7, was not
“arbitrary and capricious” in chara cterizing coca ine as a “h abit-form ing narc otic
drug”); United States v. Prescott, 6 C.M.R. 122, 124-25 (1952) (upholding MCM
1951, supra note 7, P 12 7, which required increased sentences for prior offenders,
as not be ing “an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of executive power” because the
provision was “not new or foreign to the customs and traditions of the several
military departments”); United States v. Firth, 37 C.M.R. 596, 600 (A.B.R. 1966)
(upholding MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 126 k, which limited confinement at hard
labor to three months, on grounds that it “is not arbitrary or capricious, but is based
on reaso nable considerations and is in keeping with established precedent and the
adm inistrative needs of the A rmed Forc es”).
214

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE MANUAL FOR COURTS -MARTIAL

42

2. Analysis and Comment
The general principles for judicial review of the Manual, which were
discussed in Part III above, provide conflicting guidance on the issue
whether military courts should invalidate arbitrary or capricious Manual
provisions. On one hand, the idea that administrative law rules found in the
APA and elsewhere should guide the military court support this type of
review. On the other hand, the principle of deference to the President
suggests that the military courts should hesitate to second-guess the wisdom
or merit of Manual provisions.221
The following rule might reconcile these competing ideas and eliminate
the apparent inconsistencies in the cases described above: Military courts
may review Manual provisions for arbitrariness or capriciousness, but only
if they prejudice “a weighty interest” of the accused. This rule affords
deference to the President, except where the deference might run afoul of
the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of Due Process. Although the rule may
not square with all military justice precedents, it does accord with the
leading cases described above. In Lucas, the Court refused to second-guess
a Manual provision that imposed a burden only on the government. In
Scheffer, by contrast, the Court reviewed the substance of a rule that
prejudiced the accused.
*138 G. The Manual Provision Interprets an Ambiguous Portion of the
UCMJ and a Better Interpretation is Possible
Like other complex statutes, the UCMJ contains some ambiguities. The
Manual interprets many of these ambiguities, but litigants often ask the
military courts to ignore the Manual interpretations. They argue that,
whenever the UCMJ contains an ambiguity, the court has the power to
adopt its own interpretation.
1. Leading Cases
The leading cases reveal three trends. First, the courts generally have
not deferred to the Manual’s interpretation of the punitive articles other
than Article 134.222 Second, they have deferred to the Manual’s interpretation of Article 134.223 Third, they have not deferred to the President’s
views about the meaning of the non-punitive articles in UCMJ.224 The

221

See
See
223
See
224
See
222

supra Part II.B.
10 U .S.C.A . §§ 8 77-9 33 (W est 1998).
id. § 934.
id. §§ 8 01-8 70, 9 35-3 6.
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following discussion describes these categories of cases.a. Punitive Articles
Other than Article 134
When interpreting ambiguous portions of the punitive articles of the
UCMJ, the courts have concluded that they do not have an absolute duty to
follow the Manual. For example, in United States v. Mance,225 a court-martial convicted the accused of wrongful use of marijuana in violation of
Article 112a based on urinalysis results.226 On appeal, the accused argued
that the government had not shown that he had the requisite knowledge to
sustain the conviction.227 This argument presented difficulty because
Article 112a did not make clear the state of knowledge required of the
accused.228
In Part IV of the Manual, the President had interpreted Article 112a’s
requirement of wrongfulness to imply that lack of knowledge of the true
nature of a substance constituted an affirmative defense.229 The Court of
Military Appeals, however, stated in Mance that it did not have to follow
*139 the interpretation of the Manual. The court explained: “Of course,
while the views of ... the President in promulgating [the Manual] are
important, they are not binding on this Court in fulfilling our responsibility
to interpret the elements of substantive offenses--at least, those substantive
crimes specifically delineated by Congress in Articles 77 through 132 of
the Code.”230
Although courts have concluded that they do not have a duty to follow
the President’s interpretation of ambiguous portions of the punitive articles,
they do not automatically reject them. Sometimes courts accept the
President’s interpretations,231 and sometimes they do not.232 The outcome
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26 M .J. 244 (C.M.A.).
See id. at 246.
227
See id. at 248-51.
228
See id. at 249.
229
See MCM , supra note 7, pt. IV, PP 37(c)(2) & (5 ).
230
Mance, 26 M .J. at 25 2.
231
See, e.g., Unite d States v. Turner, 42 M.J. 689, 690 (Army Ct. Crim. App.
1995) (following M CM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 54c(4)(a)(ii)’s interpretation of
when an unloaded pistol is a “dangerous weapon” for the purposes of Article 128).
232
See, e.g., United States v. Jen kins, 22 C.M .R. 51 , 52 (1 956 ) (refusing to
follow MCM 195 1, supra note 7, P 162, which interpreted “enlistment” to include
induction, as an unreasonable interpretation of article 83); United States v.
Rushlow, 10 C.M.R. 139, 142 (1953) (refusing to follow MCM 195 1, supra note
7, P 164a, which said that a contingent purpose to return may be considered as
intent to re main away perma nently for the purpose of Article 85 ).
226
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simply depends on whether the courts think that the President has adopted
the best reading of the ambiguous language. Only in a few cases have the
courts expressed conscious deference to the Manual’s interpretation of the
punitive articles other than Article 134.233 b. Article 134
Courts have treated the Manual’s interpretation of Article 134 differently. Article 134 authorizes courts-martial to try any person subject to
their jurisdiction for “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of the good
order and discipline in the armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and offenses not capital.”234
The President has included in Part IV of the Manual a non-exclusive list of
fifty-three different specifications of disorders and conduct that he believes
would fall within the open-ended language of Article 134.235 *140 These
include everything from fraternization 236 and gambling237 to involuntary
manslaughter238 and kidnapping. 239
The courts generally have deferred to the President’s specifications
when reviewing Article 134 cases. For example, in United States v.
Caver,240 a court-martial convicted the accused of violating the Manual’s
specification of “indecent language” under Article 134 when he called a
soldier a derogatory name.241 The accused challenged the specification and
argued that his words did not violate Article 134.242 Rejecting this
argument, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
Great deference is accorded the determinations of Congress and the
President relating to the rights of servicemembers.... Accordingly,
we are of the view that as long as language uttered by a servicemember is “indecent,” as defined by the President in the Manual for
Court-Martial, and is “to the prejudice of good order and discipline
in the armed forces” or “of a nature to bring discredit upon the

233
See, e.g., United States v. Margelony, 33 C.M.R. 267, 269 -70 (1963) (stating
that the Manual’s interpretation of article 123a is entitled to great weight).
234
10 U .S.C.A . § 93 4 (W est 1998).
235
See MCM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 61-113.
236
See id. P 83.
237
See id. P 84.
238
See id. P 85.
239
See id. P 92.
240
41 M .J. 556 (N .M. Ct. Crim . App .. 199 4).
241
See MCM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 89.
242
See Caver, 41 M .J. at 56 1 n.4.
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armed forces,” as proscribed by Congress in Article 134, it may be
the basis for disciplinary action under the Code ....243
Other cases interpreting Article 134 have shown similar deference to the
President’s specifications,244 although at least one decision has not.245
c. Other UCMJ Articles
Courts have shown less deference to the President’s interpretation of the
non-punitive articles of the UCMJ. For example, in United States v. Ware,
the Court of Military Appeals rejected the President’s interpretation *141
of Article 62.246 Article 62 says that the convening authority may send a
ruling back to the court-martial for reconsideration.247 The 1969 Manual
interpreted Article 62 to imply that the military judge, upon reconsideration, had to “accede” to the convening authority’s views.248 The court
rejected this interpretation, concluding that “reconsider” does not mean
“accede.”249 Other cases also have rejected the Manual’s interpretation of
non-punitive UCMJ articles.250
2. Analysis and Comment
The general principle that the military courts should defer to the
President supports the cases that have followed the Manual’s interpretation
of Article 134.251 Article 134 contains such broad language that its
enforcement inevitably raises policy questions. The courts have respected
the separation of powers by not undertaking to answer these questions
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Id.
See, e.g., United States v. Lowery, 21 M.J. 998, 1000 (A.C.M.R. 1986)
(following specification of fraternization under Article 13 4), aff’d 24 M.J. 347
(C.M.A. 1987) (summary disposition); United States v. Love, 15 C.M.R. 260, 262
(1954) (following M CM 195 1, supra note 7, P 209, which defined the term
“structure ” to include a “tent” for the purposes of the unlawful entry specification
in Article 134 ).
245
See United States v. Asfeld, 30 M.J. 917, 927 (A.C.M.R. 1990) (refusing to
defer to the Manual specification of obstructing justice).
246
United States v. W are, 1 M.J. 282 (C.M.A. 19 76).
247
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 86 2 (W est 1998).
248
See MCM 196 9, supra note 7 , P 67 f.
249
See 1 M.J. at 285.
250
See, e.g., Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M .J. 90, 93 (C.M.A. 198 8) (invalidating Military
Rule of Evidence 916(k)(1) as an improper interpretation of article 50(a)); United
States v. Kossman, 38 M.J. 258, 260-61 & n.3 (C.M .A. 19 93) (refusing to defer to
the President’s interpretation of Article 10 in R.C.M. 707 ).
251
See supra Part III.B.
244
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themselves. Instead, they have deferred to the President who, as Commander-in-Chief, has expertise in the area of military justice. Congress
presumably intended this approach; the open-ended language of Article 134
exhibits a need for narrowing by the President.252
Despite the general principle of deference, some arguments may support
the position that the courts do not have to follow the President’s interpretation of the punitive articles other than Article 134. The federal courts
generally do not defer to the Department of Justice when it advances
interpretations of the United States Criminal Code.253 Moreover, an
inference that Congress intended the military courts to defer seems less
likely in the *142 case of the punitive articles other than Article 134.254
The UCMJ defines the offenses covered by those articles much more
specifically. Congress thus appears to have had less of an intent to delegate.
With respect to Manual interpretations of non-punitive articles of the
UCMJ, the lack of deference comes as somewhat of a surprise. These
articles establish the workings of the military justice system. To the extent
that they contain ambiguities, the Commander-in-Chief should have the
authority to settle their meaning because he has responsibility for administering the military justice system. Moreover, while the military courts do
not defer to the Manual when interpreting these provisions, they do accord
“great weight” to executive interpretations found in other sources.255 The
military courts, accordingly, should rethink their position on this issue, and
consider according greater deference to the Manual.256
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See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 73 3, 754 (1974) (upho lding Article 134 against
a vagu eness c hallenge).
253
See Babb itt v. Sweet Home C hapter of Communities, 515 U.S. 687, 703 n.
18 (1995) (discussing the applicatio n of Chevron in criminal cases); Dan M. Kaha n,
Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law, 110 HARV. L. REV.. 469, 489
(1996) (noting that federal courts do not apply the Chevron rule in cases und er T itle
18 of the U.S.C., but presenting arguments against this position).
254
See supra Part III.B.2.
255
See, e.g., United States v. Margelony, 33 C.M.R. 267, 269-70 (1965)
(interpreting Article 123a); United States v. Rob inson, 20 C.M.R. 63 (1955)
(interpretating 10 U.S.C. § 608, which prohibits officers from using enlisted
members as servants).
256
But see Fidell, supra note 25, at 6055 (arguing against deference to the
President on matters of trial procedures on grounds that military courts “would
certainly be closer to these questions than would a civilian Chief Executive who
may or may not be an attorney, and who, even if legally trained, may be much
further from trial experience than the judges of the reviewing court”).
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H. The President Promulgated the Manual Provisions Pursuant to an
Improper Delegation
Two administrative law doctrines limit Congress’s ability to delegate
lawmaking authority. The “non-delegation” doctrine states that Congress
may not assign its legislative powers.257 The “intelligible principle”
doctrine says that, when Congress provides the executive branch with
discretion in fulfilling statutory commands, it must state an intelligible
principle *143 to guide exercise of the discretion.258 Litigants in military
cases have challenged Manual provisions under both doctrines.
1. Leading Cases
Two years ago, the Supreme Court decided the leading military case
concerning whether these doctrine apply to the Manual. In Loving v. United
States, a court-martial convicted the accused, Dwight J. Loving, of murder
in violation of Article 118.259 Article 118 authorizes the death penalty for
murder,260 but does not limit the class of offenders eligible for capital
punishment as the Supreme Court has required since Furman v. Georgia.261
The President, accordingly, promulgated Rule for Court-Martial
1004(c), which provides that a court-martial may sentence an accused to
death for murder only if it finds the existence of one or more “aggravating
factors” listed in the Rule.262 In Loving, the court-martial found three of the
aggravating factors listed in Rule 1004(c), and decreed that Loving should
receive capital punishment.263 Loving challenged his sentence, arguing
among other things that the President’s creation of the list of aggravating
257

See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)
(Taft, C.J.) (“[I]t is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up
its legislative power and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if
by law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either executive power or
judicial power”); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theo ry of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNE LL L. REV . 1, 7-17 (1982 ) (discussing the history of the non-delegation
doctrine).
258
To uby v. U nited States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 -166 (1991 ) (describing
intelligible princip le cases); Do nald A . Drip ps, Delegation and Due Process, 1988
DU KE L.J. 65 7, 66 9-71 (explaining the non-d elegation do ctrine).
259
Loving v. United States, 517 U .S. 748, 751 (199 6).
260
10 U.S.C.A. § 918 (West 1998) (“Any person subject to this chapter who,
without justification or excuse, unlawfully kills a human being ... shall suffer death
or imp risonm ent for life as a court-martial may d irect.”).
261
408 U .S. 238 (1972 ).
262
MCM , supra note 7 , R.C.M. 100 4(c).
263
See Loving, 517 U.S. at 751.
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factors in Rule 1004(c) violated both the non-delegation doctrine and the
intelligible principle doctrine.264 a. Non-Delegation Doctrine
Loving asserted that Congress could not authorize the President to
establish the list of aggravating factors in Rule 1004(c) for two reasons.
First, Loving contended that Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution gives Congress exclusive power to “make [r]ules for the [g]overnment
*144 and [r] egulation of the land and naval forces.”265 The Supreme
Court, however, rejected this position based on an extensive examination
of the history of courts-martial in this country and England.266 It concluded
that “[u] nder Clause 14, Congress, like Parliament, exercises a power of
precedence over, not exclusion of, Executive authority.” 267 The President
thus may formulate rules to govern military subjects not covered by statute.
Second, Loving argued that only Congress has the power to define
criminal punishments.268 The Supreme Court rejected this position based
on precedent. The Court said: “We have upheld delegations whereby the
Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct
will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a
criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations ‘confin[e]
themselves within the field covered by the statute.”’269 The Court
accordingly concluded that Congress could leave implementation of the
capital murder provisions in the UCMJ to the President.270 b. Intelligible
Principle Doctrine
The Supreme Court has held that, when Congress grants the President
or an executive agency discretion, it must “lay down ... an intelligible
principle to which the person ... authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”
271
Loving argued that Congress failed to satisfy this requirement when it
directed the President to create Rules for Courts-Martial in the UCMJ.272
Article 36, he contended, directed the president to make evidentiary and
procedural rules, but did not specifically tell the President what principles
should guide his discretion.273
264

See id. at 759-69 (non-delegation); id. at 771-73 (intelligible princip le).
See id. at 759.
266
See id. at 760-68 .
267
Id. at 767.
268
See id. at 768-69 .
269
Id. at 768 (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 51 8 (1911 )).
270
See id. at 769.
271
J.W. H ampton Jr. & Co . v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 , 409 (1928 ).
272
See Loving, 517 U.S. at 772 .
273
See id.
265
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The Supreme Court also rejected this argument in Loving.274 It
concluded that the intelligible principle doctrine required Congress to
provide less guidance when it delegated authority to a person who already
had considerable*145 expertise and experience in the area, as the Commander-in-Chief has over the armed forces.275 The Court explained: “We
think ... that the question to be asked is not whether there was any explicit
principle telling the President how to select aggravating factors, but
whether any such guidance was needed, given the nature of the delegation
and the officer who is to exercise the delegated authority.”276 In this case,
the Court noted that Congress had authorized the death penalty, and that the
President’s role as Commander-in-Chief already made him responsible for
superintending courts-martial.277
2. Analysis and Comment
In Loving v. United States, the Supreme Court performed a valuable
service in clarifying the applicability of non-delegation doctrine and
intelligible principle doctrine to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of
RCM 1004(c). Before Loving, the Court of Military Appeals and the Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces repeatedly had faced questions about the
constitutionality of Rule 1004(c).278 Resolving Loving’s arguments had
great importance to the military justice system.
Although Loving technically concerned only Rule 1004(c), its reasoning
will have a greater impact. The Court’s ruling that Article I, section 8,
clause 14 does not give Congress the exclusive power to make substantive
rules concerning punishment for offenses will preclude nearly all challenges to Manual provisions under the delegation doctrine. The same
conclusion holds true for claims under the intelligible principle doctrine.
Articles 18, 36, and 56 all delegate authority to the President to pass rules,
but none of them details the content of the Rules. Loving makes clear that
this silence does not matter because of the President’s unique relationship
to the military.
Loving also provides guidance to the military courts as they attempt to
develop general principles for reviewing Manual provisions. In Loving, the
274

See id.
See id.
276
Id.
277
See id.
278
See United States v. Curtis, 32 M .J. 252, 26 0-67 (C.M .A.), cert. denied 502
U.S. 952 (199 1); United States v. Loving, 41 M.J. 213, 29 1 (1994 ), aff’d 517 U.S.
748 (19 96).
275
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Supreme Court started with the assumption that ordinary administrative law
doctrines--like the non-delegation doctrine and the intelligible principle
doctrine--applied to the UCMJ and the Manual. The Court, however,*146
considered and gave great weight to the role of the President in conducting
the special business of the armed forces. Absent other guidance, the
military courts should rely on these principles in handling other challenges
to the Manual.279
I. The Manual Provision Violates the Accused’s Constitutional Rights
Service members, like civilians, have constitutional rights. In some
instances, the accused in courts-martial have argued that Manual provisions
infringe these rights. The military courts have entertained these claims, but
rarely have struck down any of the rules of evidence and procedure that the
President has promulgated.
1. Leading Cases
In United States v. Jacoby, the Court of Military Appeals proclaimed
that “the protections in the Bill of Rights, except those which are expressly
or by necessary implication inapplicable, are available to the members of
our armed forces.”280 The military courts, accordingly, have entertained
challenges to Manual provisions under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendments. They also have considered claims that applying new
Manual provisions would violate the ex post facto clause.
a. First Amendment
The First Amendment protects the freedom of speech and religion and
other rights.281 In Goldman v. Weinberger, the Supreme Court held that,
although service members enjoy the protections of the First Amendment,
“review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is
far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regula-

279

See supra Part III.A. & B.
United States v. Jac oby, 2 9 C.M.R. 24 4, 24 6-47 (1960). See also United
States v. Lopez, 35 M.J. 35, 41 (C.M.A. 1992); FRANCIS GILL IGAN &
FRED RIC LEDERER, COU RT-MART IAL PROCEDU RE §§ 1-52.00, 26 (1991)
(noting that scholars disagree about the application of the B ill of Rights to the
military). The Sup reme Court has not determined the entire extent to which the B ill
of Rights app lies to the armed forces.
281
See U.S. CON ST. amend . 1 (“Congress shall make now law respecting
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Governm ent for redress of greivances.”).
280
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tions*147 designed for civilian society.”282 Accordingly, the military courts
have rejected most First Amendment challenges to Manual provisions.283
b. Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures
and imposes limitations on the issuance of warrants.284 The Court of
Military Appeals has held that the oath requirement in the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the military,285 but otherwise has said that “the
Fourth Amendment applies with equal force within the military as it does
in the civilian community.”286 Litigants rarely challenge Manual provisions
under the Fourth Amendment because the Military Rules of Evidence
implement most of the Amendment’s protections.287 The military courts,
nevertheless, have considered some challenges to Manual provisions.288
*148 c. Fifth Amendment

282

Go ldma n v. W einbe rger, 475 U .S. 50 3, 50 7 (1986 ).
See, e.g., United States v. Caver, 41 M.J. 556, 561 n.4 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.
1994) (upholding M CM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 89, which specifies indecent
language as a violation of article 134); United States v. Lowery, 21 M.J. 998, 1000
(A.C.M.R. 198 6), aff’d 24 M.J. 347 (C.M .A. 1987) (summary disposition)
(upholding MCM , supra note 7 , pt. IV, P 83 , which specifies fraternization as a
violation of Article 134).
284
See U.S. CONST. amend. 4.
283

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.Id.
285
See United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347 (C.M.A. 198 1).
286
United States v. Ezell, 6 M .J. 307, 31 5 (C.M.A. 19 79). But see Fredric I.
Lederer & Frederic L. B orch, Does the Fourth Amendment Apply to the Armed
Forces?, 144 M IL. L. REV. 110, 123 (1994) (questioning whether the military
courts actually have applied the F ourth Amendment).
287
See MCM, supra note 7, MIL. R. EV ID. 311-317 ; United States v. Hester,
47 M.J. 461, 46 3, cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 125 (1998) (noting that these rules
implement the Fourth Amendment).
288
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 45 M.J. 652 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1997)
(hold ing M ilitary Rule of Evidenc e 313(b) satisfies the F ourth Amendment).
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The Fifth Amendment contains four clauses.289 The first clause requires
indictment by a grand jury, but contains an express exception for the
military. In view of this exception, no cases have held that Manual
provisions violate the indictment requirement.
The second clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits double jeopardy.
The Supreme Court has held that this provision applies to courts-martial.290
In addition, Article 44 also prohibits trying the accused twice for the same
crime.291 The Court of Military Appeals rejected at least one challenge to
a Manual provision on double jeopardy grounds.292
The third clause of the Fifth Amendment establishes the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination. The Court of Military Appeals held
that this provision applies to the military.293 Article 31, however, offers
even broader protection against self-incrimination.294 Consequently, most
litigants rely on Article 31 rather than the Fifth Amendment when

289

See U.S. CONST. amend. 5.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a G rand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual
service in time of W ar or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; no r shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.Id.
290
See Wade v Hunter, 336 US 684 , 688 -89 (1 949 ). See also United States v.
Richardson, 44 C.M.R. 108, 111 (1971) (confirming that the Fifth Amendment
applies to the military).
291
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (W est 1998) (“No perso n may, w ithout his consent,
be tried a second time for the same offense.”).
292
United States v. Burroughs, 12 M.J. 380, 382 n.2 (C.M.A. 198 2) (holding
that M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 71a does not vio late do uble jeop ardy).
293
See United States v. Kemp , 32 C .M.R. 89, 97 (196 2) (“[P]ersons in the
military service [have] the full protection against self-incrimination afforded by the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
294
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 831(a) (“No person subject to this chapter may compel
any person to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which
may tend to inc riminate him.”).
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contesting*149 rules in the Manual.295 A few cases nonetheless have
considered whether Manual provisions violate the privilege.296
The third clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits depriving any person
of life or liberty without due process of the law. The Supreme Court
recently reviewed a due process challenge to a Manual provision in United
States v. Scheffer.297 The military courts have considered numerous due
process challenges, but usually have upheld the Manual.298

295

See, e.g., United States v. Musguire, 25 C.M.R. 329, 330 (1958) (“Article 31
is wider in scope than the Fifth Amendm ent.”).
296
See, e.g., United States v. Eggers, 11 C.M.R. 191 , 194 (1953 ) (invalidating
MCM 1951, supra note 7, P 150(b), which permitted the court to compel
handwriting samples, as violative of the Article 31(a) and the Fifth Amendment);
United States v. Greer, 13 C .M.R. 13 2, 13 4 (1953 ) (same). The military courts in
recent years have ad opted a less strict view o f Article 3 1. See, e.g., United States
v. Harden, 18 M.J. 81, 82 (C.M.A. 1984) (holding that Article 31 does not apply
to handwriting exem plars).
297
See 118 S. Ct. 1261 , 1264 & n.3 (1998).
298
See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 45 M.J. 323, 324 (1996) (upholding R .C .M .
305 as sufficiently protecting service members against unconstitutional deprivations
of liberty); United States v. Teeter, 16 M.J. 68 (C.M.A. 1983) (upholding MCM
1969, supra note 7, P 75c(3), which addressed extenuating evidence, against a due
process challenge); Font v. Seaman, 43 C.M .R. 227, 230-31 (19 71) (upholding
MCM 196 9, supra note 7, P 20b, concerning restraint); United States v. Harper, 22
M.J. 157, 162 (C.M.A. 198 6) (upholding M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 213g(5)
against a claim that it improperly shifted the burden of proof); United States v.
W right, 48 M.J. 896, 899-901 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998) (upho lding Military Rule
of Evidence 413, which permits introduction of evidence of past sexual misconduc t,
against due process and equal protection challenges); United States v. Salvador, No.
ACM 307 15, 1 995 W L 32 944 4, *4 (A .F. Ct. Crim. App. May 24, 1995 ) (upholding
R .C .M . 1113(d)(3) against a claim that it impermissibly allows additional
confinement for failure to pay a fine due to indigency); United States v. Bassano,
23 M.J. 661, 66 3 (A.F.C.M .R. 19 86) (upholding M CM , supra note 7, pt. IV, P 37
against a claim that it impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in controlled
substance prosecutions); United States v. McIver, 4 M.J. 900, 902 (N.M.C.M.R.
1978) (upholding M CM 196 9, supra note 7 , P 152, which concerned suppression
of evidence, against a due process challenge); United States v. Bielecki, 44 C.M.R.
774 , 777 (N.M .C.M .R. 19 71) (upholding M CM 196 9, supra note 7, P 6 7f, which
allowed the convening authority to review the trial); United States v. Coleman, 41
C.M.R. 832, 835 (N.M .C.M.R. 197 0) (upholding MCM 196 9, supra note 7, P 75d,
which authorized introduction of an accused’s record of prior nonjudicial
punishment for the purpo se of sen tence aggravation).
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The fourth clause of the Fifth Amendment--the takings clause--requires
the government to pay just compensation when it takes private property for
public use. The Court of Military Appeals suggested that this *150 clause
protects service members.299 The military courts, however, have not
considered any claims that Manual provisions violate the clause.
d. Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment protects a variety of different rights applicable
to criminal trials.300 The Amendment’s initial clause contains four very
specific guarantees. First, the initial clause provides a right to a speedy
trial. The Court of Military Appeals decided that service members enjoy
this right.301 In addition, the accused also enjoys speedy trial protections
under Articles 10 and 33 and Rule for Courts-Martial 707. 302 Because these

299

United State v. Pa ige, 7 M .J. 480, 48 4 & n.8 (C.M.A. 197 9) (citing Turney
v. United States, 115 F. Supp . 457 (Ct. Cl. 1953)).
300
See U.S. CONST. amend. 6.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have bee n com mitted, which d istrict shall have be en previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.Id.
301
See United States v. Mason, 45 C .M.R. 16 3, 16 7 (1972 ) (“The Sixth
Amendment affords an acc used the right to a speedy trial.”). MCM , supra note 7,
R .C .M . 707 (d) ex pressly recognizes this “constitutional right to a speedy trial.”
Interesting, as recently as 1967, the government argued that the speedy trial
guarantee of the Sixth Amendm ent did not apply to the military. See United States
v. Lamphere, 37 C .M.R. 200 , 202 (C.M .A. 1967) (noting government’s argument
that “the speedy trial clause of the Sixth Amendm ent to the Constitution of the
United States d oes not apply in trials by court-martial; only the “spirit” of this
constitutional provision extends to the military by way of [UCMJ articles 10 and
33]”).
302
See 10 U .S.C.A . § 81 0 (W est 1998) (“W hen an y perso n subject to this
chapter is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, immediate steps shall be
taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or
to dismiss the charges and release him.”); id. § 833 (“When a person is held for trial
by general court-martial the commanding officer shall, within eight days after the
accused is ordered into arrest or confinement, if practicable, forward the ch arges,
together with the investigation and allied papers, to the officer exercising general
court-martial ju risd ic tio n.” ); M C M , supra note 7, R.C.M. 707 (“The accused shall
be brought to trial within 120 days ....”).
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articles and this rule provide greater protection than the Sixth *151
Amendment, litigants generally have not claimed that Manual provisions
violate the constitutional speedy trial guarantee.303
Second, the initial clause of the Sixth Amendment requires a public
trial. The Court of Military Appeals held that this right extends to service
members. 304 (The accused also has a right to a public trial under Rule
806.305 ) In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has ruled
that the Sixth Amendment entitles the accused to a public Article 32
investigative hearing.306 Litigants have not claimed that Manual provisions
violate these rights.
Third, the initial clause of the Sixth Amendment provides a right to a
jury trial. The military courts, however, have held that this protection does
not extend to courts-martial.307 Accordingly, litigants have not challenged
Manual provisions on this ground.
Fourth, the initial clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right
to trial in the place where the crime occurred. The military courts have not
held that this guarantee applies to courts-martial.308 Accordingly, no
303

See United States v. King, 30 M.J. 59, 62 & n.5 (C.M .A. 1990).
See United States v. Hershey, 20 M.J. 433, 435 (C.M.A. 1985) (“Without
question, the sixth-amendment right to a public trial is applicable to courts-martial.”); United States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116, 120 (C.M.A. 1977) (“The right of an
accused to a public trial is a sub stantial right secured by the Sixth Amendme nt to
the Constitution of the United States.”). The Court of Military Appeals at one time
took the contra ry position. See United States v. Brown, 22 C.M.R. 41, 47 (C.M.A.
195 6) (citing that older authorities ind icating that the Sixth Amendment right to a
pub lic trial did not ap ply), overruled in part by Unite d Sta te s v. Grunden, 2 M.J.
116 , 120 n.3 (C .M.A. 19 77).
305
See M C M , supra note 7, R.C.M. 806(a) (“Exc ept as o therwise provided in
this rule, courts-martial shall be open to the public.”).
306
See ABC, Inc. v. Powell, 47 M.J. 363, 365 (1997) (“Today we make it clear
that, absent ‘cause shown that outweighs the value of openness,’ the military
accused is likewise entitled to a public Article 32 investigative hearing.” (citations
omitted)).
307
See United States v. Guilford, 8 M.J. 598, 601 (A.C.M.R. 197 9) (“The right
to a trial by jury as contemp lated in the Sixth Amendment does not apply to military
trials of members of the armed forces in active se rvice.”); United States v. Ez ell, 6
M.J. 307 , 327 n.4 (C.M .A. 1979) (Fletcher, C. J., concurring).
308
See United States v. Culp, 33 C.M.R. 411, 418 (1963) (opinion of Kilday, J)
(“I know of no contention, or decision, that trial by court-martial shall be in “the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been com mitted, which d istrict shall
have been previously ascertained by law,” as is clearly required by the Amendment
304
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military*152 courts have invalidated Manual provisions for violating this
provision.
The second clause of the Sixth Amendment requires the accused to “be
informed of the nature and causes of the accusation.”309 The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces has applied this provision to the service
members.310 The military courts, however, have upheld Manual provisions
against claims that they violate this constitutional requirement.311
The third clause of the sixth amendment--the “confrontation clause”-guarantees the accused the right to confront witnesses. The Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces has held that this protection applies to
service members in courts-martial.312 Although the Confrontation Clause
may limit introducing hearsay, the military courts have rejected challenges
to the hearsay exceptions in the Manual.313
The fourth clause of the Sixth Amendment establishes the right to
compulsory process for obtaining evidence. The Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces has held that service members enjoy this right in courts-martial.314 The Military Rules of Evidence and Rules for Courts-Martial

....”).

309

U.S. CO NS T. amend. 6. See also 10 U.S.C.A. § 81 0 (W est 1998) (requiring
similar notification).
310
See United States v. Brown, 45 M .J. 389, 39 5 (1996 ).
311
See, e.g., United S tates v. Leslie, 2 C.M.R. 622, 624 (C.G.B.R. 1951)
(upholding M CM 195 1, supra note 7, PP 74 b(2) and (3)).
312
See United States v. So jfer, 47 M.J. 425, 42 8 (1998 ).
313
See United States v. Clark, 35 M .J. 98 , 106 (C.M .A. 1992) (upholding
Military Rule of Evidence 803(4)’s exception for statements made for the purpo se
of medical treatment); United States v. Cottrill, No. ACM 30951, 1995 WL 611299,
*2 (A.F. Ct. Crim . App . Sept. 26, 1995 ) (same), aff’d 45 M .J. 485 (1997); United
States v. Fling, 40 M.J. 847 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994) (upholding Military Rule of
Evidence 803(2)’s exception for excited utterance); United States v. Reggio, 40
M.J. 694, 698 n.7 (N.M.C.M.R. 1994) (same); United States v. Gans, 32 M.J. 412,
417 (C.M.A. 199 1) (upholding Military Rule of Evidence 803(5)’s exception for
past recollection recorded of decea sed witness).
For cases q uestioning or lim iting evidence rules, see United S tates v. Groves,
23 M .J. 374 (C.M .A. 1987) (holding that Military Rule of Evidence 804(b )(4)’a
exception for statem ents of persona l or family history is limited by the confrontation
clause); United States v. Co rdero, 22 M.J. 216, 220 (C.M.A. 1986) (opinion of
Everett, J.) (questioning whether Military Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) imposes
restrictions necessary to satisfies the confrontation clause).
314
United States v. Ca bral, 47 M .J. 268, 27 1 (1997 ).
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attempt to satisfy this rule. The military courts, nevertheless, have had to
*153 consider whether Manual provisions violate the constitutional
guarantee.315
The fifth and final clause of the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to
counsel. The courts have held that this right applies to general and special
courts-martial, but not to summary courts-martial.316 The accused has
similar statutory protection under Article 27.317 The military courts have
considered whether particular Manual provisions violate the right to
assistance of counsel, but usually under Article 27 rather than the Sixth
Amendment.318
e. Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment bans excessive bail requirements, excessive
fines, and cruel and unusual punishment.319 The UCMJ contains a similar
provision; Article 55 provides that “[p]unishment by flogging, or by
branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or any other cruel or unusual
punishment, may not be adjudged by a court-martial or inflicted upon any
person subject to this chapter.”320 The military courts have never held that
the excessive bail prohibition applies to courts-martial, and have not
invalidated any Manual provision based upon it.321 The Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces has considered whether sentences impose “excessive

315

See United States v. Scheffer, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 126 5 (1998 ) (rejecting
contention that Rule 707(a)’s ban on polygraph evidence violated the Sixth
Amendment); United States v. Breeding, 44 M.J. 345, 354 (1996) (Sullivan, J.,
concurring) (asserting that R.C.M. 703 violates the rights of compulsory process).
316
See United States v. Fluellen, 40 M.J. 96, 98 (C.M.A. 1994); United States
v. Sco tt, 24 M .J. 186 (C.M.A. 19 87).
317
See 10 U.S.C.A. § 827(a)(1) (W est 1998 ) (“Trial coun sel and defense
counsel shall be detailed for each general and special court-martial.”).
318
See United States v. Jones, 3 M.J. 677, 678 (C.G .C.M.R. 197 7) (upholding
MCM 196 9, supra note 7, P 6d which said that it “desirable” for the accused to
have as many counsel as the government, but not required); United States v.
McF adden, 42 C.M .R. 14, 16 (1970 ) (limiting MCM 196 9, supra note 7, P 47 so
that it did not pro hibit uncertified assist defense counsel).
319
See U.S. CON ST. amend . 8 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
320
10 U .S.C.A . § 85 5. See United States v. Wappler, 9 C.M.R. 23, 26 (1953)
(hold ing that § 855 provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment).
321
Cf. Levy v. Resor, 37 C.M.R. 399, 409 (1967) (rejecting a claim that
post-trial confinement could implicate the excessive bail prohibition).
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*154 fines” in violation of the Eighth Amendment.322 The military courts,
however, have not struck down any Manual provisions on this ground.
In Loving v. United States, the Supreme Court assumed, but did not
hold, that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment limited capital punishment under the UCMJ.323 The Court,
however, did not invalidate Rule for Court-Martial 1004(c), which specifies
aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 324
Separately, the military courts have adopted a limiting construction for
Rule 1003, which authorizes confinement to bread and water, so that it does
not violate the Eighth Amendment.325
f. Ex Post Facto Clause
The Ex Post Facto clause326 bars retroactively applying new criminal
legislation.327 The President from time to time has updated the Manual by
adding new rules.328 The military courts, accordingly, have had to consider
whether retroactively applying new Manual provisions in some way may
violate this protection.329 *155
2. Analysis and Comment

322

United States v. Sumrall, 45 M.J. 207 , 210 (1996). See also United States v.
Lee, 43 M .J. 518, 521 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995 ).
323
See Loving v. United States, 517 U .S. 748, 755 (199 6).
324
See id. at 755-76 .
325
See United States v. Yatchak, 35 M.J. 379, 308 (C.M.A. 1992) (holding that
R .C .M . 1003(b )(9) does not permit confinement to bread and water while attached
to a ship undergoing a major overall in dock).
326
See U.S. CO NST . art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“No B ill of Attainder or ex po st facto Law
shall be passed.”).
327
See United States v. Gorski, 4 7 M .J. 370, 374 (1997) (holding that
application of article 58b to offenses preceding its enactment would violate the ex
post facto principle). See gen erally DANIEL E. TROY, RETROACTIVE
LEG ISLAT ION 47 (1998 ).
328
Cf. United States v. Worley, 42 C.M.R. 46 , 47 (1970) (holding that the
President may change rules within his powers under Article 36 even if the new rules
upset existing ca se law).
329
See United States v. Ra msey, 28 M.J. 370, 371 (CMA 1 989) (rejecting an ex
post facto challenge to the application of R.C.M. 707(c)); United States v. Hise, 42
C.M.R. 195, 197 (1 970) (upholding an ex po st facto challenge to the application of
MCM 196 9, supra note 7 , P 14 0a). Cf. United States v. Derrick, 42 C .M .R. 835,
838 (A.C.M.R. 1970) (explaining how application of new versions of the Manual
may violate the prohibition on ex post facto laws).
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The foregoing cases show that the military courts review the constitutionality of Manual provisions, but rarely strike them down. This observation should come as little surprise. The President does not stand above the
Constitution and cannot transgress its commands by executive order. At the
same time, however, the President would have little desire to create
unconstitutional Manual provisions. Promulgating rules for the military
justice system that violate the basic rights of service members would create
dissension and hinder the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief.
Litigants challenging Manual provisions, accordingly, should not rely
on the Constitution alone. As noted above, in most instances, the UCMJ
creates protections similar to those in the Bill of Rights. Sometimes these
protections address the same subject, but extend further than the Constitution.330 Thus, litigants may fare better arguing that Manual provisions
conflict the UCMJ.331 [FN331]
Questions about the meaning of the various clauses of the Bill of Rights
and the Ex Post Facto clause lie outside of the scope of this article. The
military courts, however, admirably have looked to the Supreme Court and
other federal courts for guidance. They have not attempted to create their
own doctrines, but instead have sought to harmonize their conclusions with
those of non-military tribunals.
V. Conclusion
Congress, the President, and the military courts all play roles with
respect to the Manual. Congress authorized its creation. The President
acted upon this authorization. Through his executive orders, he has
established the Rules for Court-Martial, the Military Rules of Evidence,
and the other portions of the Manual. The military courts then have had the
duty not merely to apply the Manual’s rules, but also to review their
legality.
The military courts have taken their responsibility to review the Manual
seriously. Since adopting the UCMJ almost five decades ago, the courts
have considered a variety of challenges, and have struck down many
Manual provisions on numerous different grounds. Sufficient precedents
*156 now have accumulated to permit a systematic examination of judicial
review of the Manual.

330

See supra Part IV.I.c.
See supra Part IV.B.

331
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This article has observed that challenges to Manual provisions tend to
fall into nine categories. Litigants have argued that courts should not
enforce Manual provisions on grounds that they are precatory, or that they
are arbitrary and capricious, or that they do not adopt the best interpretation
of the UCMJ. In addition, litigants have complained that Manual provisions
conflict with federal statutes, service regulations, or other Manual
provisions. They also have argued that the UCMJ provides no authority for
the Manual provisions or that the Constitution does not permit Congress to
delegate authority to the President. Finally, some service members have
contended that Manual provisions violate their constitutional rights.
This article has described and analyzed each of these categories. In
addition to making various minor criticisms, the article has advanced three
recommendations:
First, in reviewing Manual provisions, courts should look to the APA
and federal administrative law cases for guidance. Although these sources
do not bind the courts, they often may provide persuasive guidance.
Throughout this article, the author has identified comparable challenges
that litigants have made when contesting federal regulations.
Second, although the military courts have both the authority and the
duty to review the Manual, they should remember to show deference to the
President. The President has responsibility for administering the military
justice system under the UCMJ and by virtue of his status as Commander-in-Chief. The military courts, accordingly, must leave certain
policy choices to the President, just as the federal courts defer to administrative agencies.
Third, the military courts should strive for consistency in their
decisions. In the past, they may have had difficulty because no single
source summarized the different types of challenges or identified the
leading precedents. This article in large part has sought to remedy this
deficiency by listing, describing, and analyzing the principal bases for
challenging Manual provisions.
This article generally has supported the work of the military judges. On
the whole, they carefully have considered the arguments of litigants, and
have attempted to create proper rules for resolving challenges to the *157
Manual. No one could fault the judges of these courts for lacking independence when deciding whether the President has erred. On the contrary, they
have not shied from this sensitive task. Any criticism presented seeks only
to improve future decisions, and therefore the military justice system.

